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Cert to CA4 (En bane: Russell
for ct~ Widener, Hall,
dissenting)

v.

MERCURY CONSTRUCTION
CORP.

Federal/Civil

Timely

SUMMARY: Petr contends that the CA4 erred in vacating the
DC's stay of proceedings pending disposition of a parallel state
court action.
FACTS: In 1975, Mercury Construction, which is incorporated
in Del. and has its principal place of business in Ala., and petr
Hospital, incorporated and doing business in N.C., entered into a
contract for the construction of hospital additions, which called

~~-~~
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- 2 for arbitration of all contract-related disputes.

The contract

also provided that disputes first be submitted to the Architect,
described in the contract as the Hospital's representive.

If the

dispute was not satisfactorily resolved in this manner, the claim
was required to be submitted to arbitration within a "reasonable
time" after it arose, and in no event after the claim would be
barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
In 1977, as work on the contract was proceeding, the
Architect asked Mercury to hold certain claims for "delays and
impact inefficiencies" until after the work was completed.

In

Jan. 1980, after timely completion of the project, Mercury
submitted its claim for delay and impact costs, and conducted
negotiations with the Architect which resulted in a reduction of
the claim in April 1980.

However, the Hospital's directors, who

claimed ignorance of the negotiations, asked for additional
information from Mercury, and finally agreed to hold a meeting on
the claim on Oct. 13, 1980.

On

Oct. 7, 1980, Hospital counsel

advised Mercury that it would not pay anything on the claim and
intended to file suit in state court seeking a declaratory
judgment that (1) it did not have to arbitrate;

(2) it owed

Mercury nothing; and (3) if it was liable to Mercury, then it was
entitled to recover the amount of its liability from the
Architect.
On

Oct. 8, 1980, the Hospital filed its action in N.C. state

court, naming Mercury and the Architect as defendants and
qlaiming, inter alia, that Mercury had waived its right to
arbitration and was barred from arbitration because of "laches
and estoppel."

On

Oct. 9, Mercury filed a demand for arbitration

with the Amercian Arbitration Association.

On

Oct. 15, the state

,/
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court issued an ex parte order barring Mercury from "taking any
action" toward arbitration of the dispute, but this order was
dissolved shortly there,ter.
action in the M.D.N.C.

On

Oct. 27, Mercury filed this

(J. Ward), alleging diversity

jurisdiction, and seeking an order of arbitration and stay of
judicial proceedings pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C.

§§

1-9.

It also petitioned for removal of the Hospital's

action to the federal court.
On

~

Dec. 24, 1980, the DC remanded the Hospital's suit to the

state court, finding that the action between Mercury and the
Hospital was not "separate and independent" from the Hospital's
claim against the Architect, and that, since the Architect was a
N.C. corporation, there was not the proper diversity between the
parties.

The DC also stayed the action before it, pending

resolution of the state court action; it did so because the state
court suit "involve[d) the identical issue of arbitrability of
the claims of Mercury ... against the ... Hospital which is
involved in this action."

Mercury sought review in the CA4 both

by appeal and mandamus.
HOLDING BELOW: The CA4, sitting en bane, reversed. 1

It held

first, with virtually no discussion, that the DC's stay order was
a "final decision" appealable under 28

u.s.c.

§

1291.

See Amdur

1 The proceedings before the CA4 were vsomewhat unusual.
Mercury filed both a petition for mandamus and notice of appeal
on Jan. 7, 1981, and the Hospital moved to dismiss the appeal on
feb. 3. On Feb. 12, a CA4 panel heard argument on the mandamus
motion and the parties were directed to brief the issue within 10
days. However, prior to issuance of an opinion, the CA ordered
an en bane hearing on the issues of mandamus and appealability,
which was held on June 1, 1981; it entered its decision on Aug.
12, 1981.

- 4 .I

v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103 (CA4 1967). It then stated that
"[t]he real issue in this case, determinative of this
appeal, is the right of [Mercury] to an order of arbitration
by the district court of its dispute with the Hospital
pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, and whether that
right, if it exists, may be frustrated by the 'reactive'
filing of a state declaratory action by the Hospital
asserting the non-arbitrability of the dispute before
Mercury had any real opportunity to seek arbitration."

v

After a lengthy discussion, the CA4 concluded that Mercury was
entitled under the Federal Arbitration Act to an order of
arbitration. Moreover, this right to arbitration could not be
nullified by the pendency of a similar action in state court.
See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 400 F.Supp.
8 8 8 , 8 9 o (N• o . I 11 • 19 7 5) , a ff ' d , 5 41 F • 2d 12 6 3 (CA 7 19 7 6) .
The CA4 read Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655
(1978), in light of Justice Blackmun's concurrence, to stand for
the proposition that "a federal court being seized of
jurisdiction of a case, [is] not to stay its proceedings in
deference to a state action unless there [are] 'exceptional
circumstances• justifying such stay •••• "

See Colorado River

Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818
(1976).

The CA found no "exceptional circumstances" in this

case; indeed, the Hospital's "precipitate resort to its state
action" was calculated to deprive Mercury of a federal forum, and
to take advantage of N.C. precedent holding that contracts such
as that between Mercury and the Hospital did not involve
"interstate commerce" and were thus outside the coverage of the
Federal Arbitration Act.

E.g., Burke Cty. Public Sch. Bd. v.

Shaver Partner, 265 S.E. 2d 481 (N.C. App. 1980).

In light of

this precedent, it was "doubtful whether the rights of Mercury as
fixed by 'federal substantive law'

[would] be recognized in state

- 5 court."

Therefore, "[t]he loss of [Mercury's] rights as

established by federal 'substantive law' in arbitration demands
that the district court not defer here."
/

J. Hall and J. Widener, in dissent, were "at a loss to

understand" why the majority had dealt primarily with Mercury's
substantive rights under the federal Act and only secondarily
with the propriety of the DC's stay.

Mercury and the Hospital

had presented the identical issues of waiver and arbitrability to
the state and federal courts, and both courts were capable of
providing appropriate relief.

The Federal Arbitration Act

contains no requirement that a federal court rule on a petition
to compel arbitration when it would "thereby duplicat[e] the
efforts of the state court and possibly contradic[t] its result."
Moreover, state judges as well as federal judges are capable of
applying the federal Act.

While the pendency of an action in the

state court is not a bar to proceedings concerning the same
matter in federal court, Colorado River, supra, at 817, a federal
court may properly stay its proceedings to avoid piecemeal or
duplicative litigation, id., at 818.

This is particularly so

when, as here, the federal court's jurisdiction is predicated
only upon the diversity of citizenship of the parties. 2

Thus,

the DC did not abuse its discretion in entering the stay.
J. Widener again dissented from denial of the petition for

rehearing.

He pointed out that the N.C. Sup Ct had recently

2The CA4 and other CAs have held that the Federal Arbitration
Act does not establish federal jurisdiction over actions
asserting rights under the Act. Some independent basis of
jurisdiction, such as diversity, must be invoked. See Sine v.
Local 992, Teamsters, 644 F.2d 997, 1001 n.9 (1981).

-
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decided Burke Cty, supra, and had overturned those state court
decisions that had declined to apply the Federal Arbitration Act
in a similar context.

279 S.E. 2d 816 (1981).

Since this

"should have disabused this court of any notions it may have had
that the North Carolina courts would not follow the federal
substantive law," J. Widen er found the denial of rehearing
"inexplicable."
J. Russell filed a short response, saying that the dissent
misconceived the real basis of the CA4 decision, which was simply
that, absent exceptional circumstances, a federal court should
not stay an action involving federal law in favor of state
proceedings.
PETR'S CONTENTIONS:
Colorado River, supra.

(1) The CA4 decision conflicts with
The "exceptional circumstances" which

Colorado River said would justify a stay exist here: a) the
identical parties and issues are before the state court; b) one
of the parties to the underlying dispute--the Architect--is
,

before only the state court; c) the state court is the only forum
in which a comprehensive resolution of all related issues may be
had.

Moreover, Colorado River involved a dismissal of the

action, not a stay; stays should be more readily available.

The

CA4 decision conflicts with other CA decisions upholding DC stays
pending disposition of parallel state actions.

E.g., State Farm

Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Scholes, 601 F.2d 1151 (CAl0 1979);
Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960 (CA2 1980).
'
(2) The DC order was not a "final decision" appealable under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Jensensius v. Texaco, Inc., 639 F.2d 1342 (CA5

1981); State Farm Mutual, supra, at 1153-53; Cotler v. InterCounty Orthopaedic Ass'n, 526 F.2d 537 (CA3 1975).

See also

-

Firestone Tire

&
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Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981) (order

denying motion to disqualify counsel nonappealable); Coopers

&

Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (197 8) (order denying class
action certification nonappealable).

Stays are by nature

tentative, not final; since the DC did not dismiss the action,
Mercury "remained free to urge reconsideration of [the] decision
to defer based on new information as to the progress of the state
case."

Will, supra, at 665 (plurality opinion).

Congress has

provided only two avenues for CA review of a DC's stay order:
certification pursuant to§ 1292(b)

(not sought here) or

mandamus.
(3) The Court should exercise its supervisory powers under
Sup Ct Rule 17.1 (a) to remedy the CA4's "wholesale diversion
from the accepted course of judicial proceedings."

The CA heard

this case on an expedited and irregular schedule, see note

1,

supra, because of the "extraordinary" nature of the writ sought
by Mercury.

However, the CA then treated the case as a normal

appeal, and decided the merits of the arbitrability question
without briefing or argument by the parties.

This procedure

misled the litigants and deprived the Hospital of any meaningful
opportunity to be heard on the merits of its case.
RESPONSE:

(1) Colorado River, supra, stressed that federal

courts have a duty to decide cases properly before them, and thus
supports the CA4 decision.

The Federal Arbitration Act was

in'tended to en sure that the arbitration procedures selected by
parties to a contract would be "speedy and not subject to delay
and obstruction in the courts."

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood

Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).

&

Thus, it

·

-
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was particularly inappropriate for the DC to defer to the state
court in an action asserting rights under that Act.
(2) The stay order had "the effect of finality."

Once the

state court ruled on the arbitrability issue, its decision would
have been res judicata.

Thus, the stay would have permanently

deprived Mercury of the federal forum provided under§ 4 of the
Arbitration Act, 9

u.s.c.

§ 4.

The CA decisions cited by petr

are factually dissimilar, in that the stay orders did not have
the effect of terminating the federal proceeding.
(3) The CA4 afforded petr an ample opportunity to be heard.
Petr not only briefed all the issues involved in the appeal, but
the CA4 also had benefit of the extensive briefs and other
materials filed with the DC.
DISCUSSION: Petr's claims are substantial~rst, it is not
at all clear that the stay order was appealable as a final
decision under 28

u.s.c.

§ 1291.

~-6-(

The plurality opinion i n ~

supra, at 664-665, suggests that it was not.

The rationale of

the CA4 precedent relied on below, e.g., Amdurs, supra, is that ·a
stay pending resolution of similar issues in state court has the
"practical effect" of a dismissal of the action~ however, Coopers
&

Lybrand, supra, rejected the somewhat similar argument that

denials of class action certification are appealable final
decisions because they have the effect of "sounding the death
knell" of the action.

Moreover, the CA4 decision conflicts with

,at least the CAl0 decision in State Farm, supra, which held that
a similar stay order was reviewable only on petition for
mandamus.

Had the CA4 ruled on Mercury's mandamus petition, it

presumably would have been limited to the question whether
Mercury had a "clear and indisputable right" to immediate

-
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adjudication of its claims in federal court.

Will, supra, at 662

(plurality opinion); see also id., at 676 (dissent).
vAs for the propriety of the stay, one could reasonably find
that there were not "exceptional circumstances" justifying
deferral to the state court, given the facts that federal law
applies to the overlapping issues; that petr apparently was
attempting to keep the matter out of federal court; and that both
state and federal actions were in the preliminary stages.
Nevertheless, assuming that the question whether to defer was
"largely committed to the 'carefully considered judgment'" of the
DC, Will, supra, at 663 (plurality), one could also question
whether Mercury had a "clear and indisputable" right to federal
adjudication that would duplicate state proceedings.

See State

Farm, supra; cf. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491
(1942) (federal court need not engage in duplicative litigation
involving questions of state law).

I agree with the dissenters

that the CA4 erred insofar as it first sought to determine
Mercury's rights under the Federal Arbitration Act and then
implied ~hat the stay was improper because the N.C. courts would
not adequately enforce those rights.

However, J. Russell's

opinion on the petition for rehearing seemed to retreat from this
position.
In all, the Court might want to grant cert if it wishes to
consider the scope of DC discretion to defer to parallel
state proceedings.

Will, the Court's most recent consideration

of the issue, produced a fragmented Court; and, following Will,
the scope of Colorado River's "exceptional circumstances"
standard is somewhat unclear.

On

the other hand, it may be that

there is a limit to the guidance that can be given to the lower

l'
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courts in this area, and that these sorts of cases are too
factually-oriented to warrant extensive review in this Court.
Given the availability of mandamus, the appealability issue is
bound up with the question of the standard of review of DC stay
orders; and I doubt the Court should grant cert to consider
appealability unless it also intends to review the propriety of
the stay.

The proceedings before the CA4 were not so irregular

as to require intervention by this Court.
There is a response.

February 8, 1982

Rosenblum
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No. 81-1203, Moses Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.

Memorandum to File

It is not easy to become interested in this case.

I hope I

did not vote to grant certiorari, though the case may be more
important than it seems.
This memo will be sketchy and dictated primarily to prompt
me to read the briefs more carefully, and also our decisions in
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424
U.S. 800 and Will v. Calvert Fire Insuran~e_f.2-.!_, 437 U.S. 655.
Petitioner, a North Carolina hospital, entered into a construetion contract with respondent, a Delaware corporation headquartered
in Alabama, to build an addition to the hospital.

The contract

provided that ''all claims and disputes ... shall be decided by
arbitration in accordance with the construction industry arbitration
\\

rules of the American Arbitration Association.

A controversy arose

as to whether delays during construction were caused by the hospital,

,

..
No. 81-1203
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and respondent filed an arbitration demand against the hospital
with the American Arbitration Association.

The hospital,

~

petitioner here, without notice, obtained - e x parte - an injunc4

-

tion from a state court barring respondent from proceeding with
arbitration until the state court held a trial on the issue of
arbitrability.
Respondent did not then file a petition to compel arbitration ~
in Federal court, but instead moved the state court to vacate its
order on the basis of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
§§ 1-9.

u.s.c.

The state court lifted its injunction, and respondent

thereupon filed in U.S. District Court this case under§ 4 of the
Act (a petition to compel arbitration), and at the same time
~

move/, the state court c~se to the same Federal district court.

Petitioner (the hospital) filed a motion to remand to the
state court, and also a motion requesting the DC to stay proceedings
on respondent's petition to compel arbitration.

-

The DC remanded

the removed action to the state court, and also stayed proceedings

No. 81-1203
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on respondent's petition to compel arbitration "pending resolution
of the state court action".

r~

The DC made no ruling on respondent's

to compel arbitration.

~
z

spondent then filed with CA 4, alternatively, a notice of

.. ~appeal

under 28 USC

'~-

...

§ 1291 and a petition seeking a writ of

: ~ , m~ndamus requiring the DC to vacate the stay order.

C,Alf

Relying on the two cases cited above in this memorandum,
CA 4 ..,. en bane , with two judges dissenting, held that the DC

IJ.c- 4, &,I
/2_/2u,

had erred in staying proceedings on respondent's petition to ~

JA,._

'
compe 1 ar b 1' t ra t ion.

I

~

. 1ed ~
· 5~
CA 4 found tha t respon d ent was ent1t
toµ

/4)~

appeal the DC's order because - even though it was not a fina~ ~
order on its face - it left the DC with nothing to do.

CA 4

-------------

further held, on the basis of undisputed facts in the record,
that respondent was entitled to an order directing arbitration ~
under the Federal Act.

4.

No. 81-1203

I have recited these proceedings in some detail because
understanding them is essential even to identifying the issue
in this curious case.

There are a number of CA 4 opinions.

The panel decision (2 to 1) upheld the action of the DC as
a ~

CA 4, en bane, disagreed with

xercise of discretion.

the panel, and reversed the DC - with Judges Widener and Hall
dissenting.

The ~

opinions do not seem to be addressing

even the same issues.
Similarly, the briefs of the parties state the questions
quite differently.

The principal question on which we granted

cert, as stated by petitioner is as follows:
Does a district court have discretion to stay
'

~

its proceedings in a diversity case pending
resolution of identical issues by a state court
having concurrent juris~iction in a prior civil
action that includes all necessary parties to
the underlying disputes?

No. 81-1203
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----

By contrast, respondent states the primary question as
follows:
May a federal district court avoid ruling on a
timely filed petition to compel arbitration filed
under§ 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act by staying
proceedings on that petition in order to permit a
state court, which does not have federal statutory
authority to compel arbitration, to decide the
federal issue of arbitrability?

Petitioner repeatedly emphasizes the duty of appellate courts
to defer to the discretion of a DC where it stays proceedings in
f ederal court pending action on the same question by a state court.
This is said to be required by comity.
Respondent argues, as did a majority of CA 4, that under the
two cases above cited, this Court requires a federal court to
compel arbitration under§ 4 of the Act, where the parties have
agreed to it, and to permit a state court to decide the federal

-

-

1

issue of arbitrability only where ~pecial circumstances exist~

No. 81-1203
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It is said that no special circumstances were identified in this
case.

The parties apparently do not deny that state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to decide whether arbitration is required.
Rather, CA 4 en bane, and respondent, read our decisions as
requiring a federal court to take jurisdiction in the absence of
special circumstances.

See Justice Blackmun's opinion in Will.

Petitioner responds that CA 4 misread Colorado River and particularly Will, and that CA 7 - on remand in Will - correctly read
our decision.

The difficulty here is that Rehnquist wrote a

plurality opinion in Will, The Chief Justice and Brennan dissented ,
and were joined between them by 4 Justices.

Blackmun wrote an

opinion concurring with Rehnquist's judgment, but emphasizing
the need for a showing of special circumstances.

No. 81-1203
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My initial impression is that CA 4 probably is right.
Certainly, respondent's brief - in which former district
judge Frank McFadden is of counsel - is the stronger brief.
On the other hand, my general disposition is to support a
DC's discretion where it stays a federal court pending decision
of the same issue by a state court.
This is the sort of question that Justice Rehnquist enjoys
debating, and I probably will await the Conference discussion
before having even a tentative view.

The primary question presented is whether the federal
district court abused its discretion in staying a proceeding to
compel arbitration pending resolution of similar issues by a state
court having prior jurisdiction.

A subsidiary question presented is whether the stay was a
final order appealable under 28

u.s.c.

§ 1291.

2.

I.

Discussion

A.

Background.
In 1975, Mercury and Moses Cone Hospital entered into a

construction contract.

Mercury agreed to construct an addition to

the hospital under the supervision of an architect selected by Cone.
The contract contained an arbitration clause covering "[a]ll claims,
disputes and other matters in question arising out of, or relating
to, this Contract or the breach thereof."

Any claims were to be

submitted first to the architect, and no demand for arbitration
could be made until the architect had acted on the claims or had
been given ten days to do so.

The contract required that claims

would be filed within a "reasonable time" after the claim arose, and
in no event after the date on which a legal or equitable claim could
have been filed.
Construction began in 1975 and was scheduled to be
completed in 1978.

Because of change orders and other work

problems, work was delayed approximately one year.

In 1977, Mercury

attempted to present a claim for delay and impact costs but was told
by Cone that it should hold its claim until the job was completed. ~
Construction was substantially completed in June, 1979, and Mercury
submitted its claim to the architect in January, 1980.
negotiations began between Mercury and the architect.

Settlement
In May, 1980,

Cone entered the negotiations, which were continued through October
to allow Cone to evaluate Mercury's claims.
agreed to resume negotiations on October 13.

The parties tentatively
On October 6,

Me~cury's counsel called to determine the status of the meeting.
Cone's counsel was uncertain and stated that he would advise Mercury

I

3.

the next day.

On October 7, Cone's counsel told Mercury that Cone

did not intend to settle and was filing immediately for a
declaratory judgment.

-

The next day, Cone filed suit against both Mercury and the
architect in state court.

Cone alleged that Mercury had failed to

yrJnegligent in not requiring the disposition of claims and disputes

~

vf·

during the course of the work.

Cone sought a declaratory judgment

"that it did not have to arbitrate and that it owed Mercury nothing
(but that if it did owe Mercury money, the Architect in turn owed
that money to the Hospital)."

Cone also sought and received an ex

parte order enjoining Mercury from bringing suit to compel
arbitration.
Mercury requested the state court to disolve the
injunction, which it did.

Mercury then filed a complaint against

Cone in federal DC, seeking_ ~

or <::!._:_?~Pelling arbitration under§

4 of the United States Arbitration Act, 9

u.s.c.

-

§ 4 (1976).

Mercury also moved for removal of the state action on the ground
that the parties in that action were diverse.

Following removal,

'

architect, one of the defendants in the state action, were not
diverse.

~c,, ,)_
,'~

JI

II

Cone also requested the DC to stay Mercury's request to

compel arbitration pending resolution of the state court action.
The DC granted both of Cone's requests.

It remanded the state case

¥'°-r

an~ stayed its own action until the state ~

~A

explained its stay by noting that the state "case involves the

i~

l

~

Cone moved to remand the action to state court because Cone and the

resolved.

: f J P " - ~ ~entical issue of arbitrability of the claims of Mercury

I

..

~ - . make a timely demand for arbitration and that the architect had been

~jATr!.k

~

The DC

•

4.

Construction Corp. against the Mose H. Cone Memorial Hospital which
is involved in [the federal] action.

Thus, a stay of this action

pending resolution of the state court action is appropriate.

E.C.

Ernst, Inc. v. Potlatch Corp., 462 F. Supp 694, 699, 701 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) ."
11

,,

M!_rc~ ry petitioned the CA4 for mandamus to compel the DC
to rule on its motion.

Alternat ~':._e ~y, Mercury sought to appeal the

---on the petition for mandamus.

stay as a final order under 28

--

-

u.s.c.

§ 1291.

The CA did not rule

It found that the stay was a final

order under Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103 (CA4 1967) and thus
appealable.
1

r\ ~

'I

The CA en bane reversed.

It found that Justice Blackmun's

ncurrence in w: 11 v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U. ~

-

655

1

C,,I~

~ (1978), was controlling, and inquired whether there were exceptional

V0

~

''

c !_E cum~ tanc 7ff that would justify the DC's exercise of discretion in
staying the suit.

The CA noted that Mercury's suit was neither a

contrived federal claim nor a reactive suit designed to delay the
state litigation.

Instead, the CA determined that Cone's suit h~d ,

been filed in state court to deny Mercury its federal right to
arbitration.

The CA noted that state courts had avoided applying

the federal Arbitration Act by interpreting its terms narrowly,
·~

·1

specifically the question of whether the underlying contract
.

.

involved interstate commerce.

The CA also determined that even

though there was a state arbitration act that act had not been
authoritatively interpreted.

Because it was doubtful that Mercury

___________________________________

_______

....,
would receive
the benefits of the federal Arbitration Act in state

court, the possible loss qf federal rights demanded that the DC

5.

proceed with Mercury's suit.

Moreover, neither party would be
~

prejudiced since the state court had taken no action.

Finally, the

--

.--.

CA observed that the DC found no
justifying a departure from the unflagging obligation of the federal
court to maintain federal jurisdiction.

Absent such findings, the

DC had no right to stay the proceedings ------- ~ ~ ~ . O v
Judge W~dene ~ dis_!! ented.

~

.:l>-----L.

His dissent w~

-

•

~ ~~
~

ted

7
primarily to refuting the biases ~ nderlying the majority opinion.
~

He noted that the state courts wJt_re bound to aQEl.Y the federal

~

Ar~

/

s~

ct ~ d : :e as competent as the federal courts to do
Additionally, the fact that one party does not desire

arbitration, while the other does, does not mean that one party is
necessarily right, an assumption that appears to have underlain the
majority opinion.

__

/

In contrast to the majority, he found nothing

reprehensible in the fact that Cone had sought to avoid arbitration
by going to state court.

He suspected that Mercury was equally

guilty of forum shopping.
Judge Hall also dissented.

He agreed that the state

courts were bound to apply the federal Arbitration Act and competent
to do so.

Although an order to compel arbitration under§ 4 can

only be attained in DC, the Act's purposes can be served in state
court.

I I

"\

He found that exceptional circumstances were present since

------------

the state court obtained jurisdiction first.

---....

Moreover, the presence

of all the parties before the state court helped prevent piecemeal
litigation.
After the CA's decision was issued, the state supreme
court issued a decision which corrected most of the majority's

,,

6.

concerns about the state courts' willingness to enforce the federal
Arbitration Act.

Cone filed a petition for rehearing based on the

intervening state decision.

The CA4 denied rehearing.

The majority

stated that although it had been concerned about the state courts'
application of the Act, its holding had rested on the fact that the
DC had not found any exceptional circumstances which would justify
staying the federal action.

------------~
This issue presents two questions.

B. Whether the DC's stay was proper.

The first concerns the

proper standard for determining when a DC should stay its action for
a pending state proceeding; the second, whether under the
circumstances of this case the DC acted properly.
Although it might have appeared that Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 {1976),
established the proper standards for the issuance of a stay, both
parties continue to disagree over the circumstances that will
justify a DC's stay pending state proceedings.

Cone argues

indirectly that the signif.icance t_hat Colorado River attached to the

-

.

federal court's unflagging obligation to exercise its jurisdiction
should be minimized in deference to considerations of judicial
economy.

Cone accomplishes this result by stressing the factors

that Colorado River found would justify staying a federal suit while
failing to mention a federal court's obligation to exercise
jurisdiction.

Cone thus cites Landis v. North American Co., 299

U.S. 248, 254-55 {1936), for the proposition that the DC's power to
stay Mercury's suit was incidental to the "power inherent in every
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court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with
economy of time and effort for itself."

Similarly, it relies on

Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942), for the
proposition that" [g]ratuitous interference with the orderly and
comprehensive disposition of a state court litigation should be
avoided".

Cone does not attach any significance to the fact that

the statement in Landis involved one federal court staying its suit
in deference to another federal court, nor does Cone consider that
the statement in Brillhart was made in the context of a declaratory
judgment.

In this regard, Cone's argument tracks Justice

Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will,
437 U.S. 655 (1978).
Mercury's argument in response is that Colorado River
clearly established that a federal court has "an unflagging
obligation" to exercise jurisdiction and that it should stay its

---

exercise only in "exceptional circumstances."

Mercury contends that

the plurality opinion in Will is not binding since Will only
concerned whether a party's right to a federal court ajudication was
,
so clear and indusputible that mandamus should issue.

Will's lax

application of the exceptional circumstances noted in Colorado River
would not apply if the question were raised on direct review rather
than mandamus.

~~

~l.vV

The Court has considered this issue twic fZl colorado River

confirmed that DCs have the power to stay their proceedings in
deference to pending state proceedings.

Although some lower federal

courts had stayed their proceedings prior to Colorado River, the
power to do so had been questionable in light of previous statements

8.

by the Court.

See County of Alleghany v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360

U.S. 185, 187 {1959)

{a DC "cannot refuse to discharge the

responsibility, imposed by Congress ••• , to grant prompt justice in
cases where its diversity jurisdiction has been properly invoked"):
McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 {1910)

{pendency of action

in state court is no bar to federal jurisdiction).

Although

Colorado River recognized the power, it did so with some caution.
While factors such as prior jurisdiction over property,
inconvenience of the federal forum, the desireability of avoiding
piecemeal litigation, and the order in which jurisdiction was
obtained could be considered in determining whether wise judicial
administration counseled in favor of a stay, Colorado River stressed
that these factors had to be balanced against a federal court's
unflagging obligation to exercise its jurisdiction.

It stated that

only the clearest of justifications would warrant dismissal.

In

applying this newly defined power, the Court relied on the federal
policy expressed in the McCarran Act to defer to a prior state
proceeding.

The degree to which the decision in Colorado River

turned on the presence of this unique factor made it difficult to
guage how this power should be exercised in more run of the mill~'
situations.
The second consideration of this issu~

alvert Fire

Insurance Co. v. Will, 437 U.S. 655 {1978), failed to produce a

----------

majority decision.

In part, this difficulty resulted from the

posture in which Will arose.

The DC had stayed a suit brought under

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in deference to a pending state
proceeding.

The CA had issued a writ of mandamus to compel the DC

9.

to hear the claim.

Certiorari was granted to determine the

propriety of mandamus to review the DC's stay.

The plurality in

Will (Rehnquist, J.) relied on the posture of the suit to uphold
what was in light of Colorado River a highly questionable decision
by the DC.

Although the posture of the suit provided the basis for

distinguishing Colorado River, the reasoning adopted by the
~

diluted the importance of a federal court's obligation to

exercise its jurisdiction.

Relying on Brillhart, the plurality

indicated that judicial economy was a sufficient justification for a
federal court to stay its proceeding when a state court had obtained
prior jurisdiction over an issue.

It stated that the "automatic

exercise" of federal jurisdiction may have been appropriate when
there was little federal/ state overlap in jurisdiction.

However,

the plurality noted that the growing caseload and interrelation of
federal and f tate issues justified reconsideration of the
proposition that a federal court should exercise its jurisdiction.
Justice Blackmun, who provided the fifth vote,
in the judgment only.

concurred

He agreed with the plurality that the

question of whether to stay a suit was committed to the DC's
discretion.

He took exception, however, with the plurality's

application of Brillhart to a federal court staying its judgment in
deference to a state action.
Justice Brennan dissented.

He found the plurality's

wholesale reliance on Brillhart misplaced.
diversity case applying state law.

Brillhart was a

More importantly, the suit in

Brillhart involved a declaratory judgment.

Unlike the statutes

mandating federal jurisdiction, the statute conferring jurisdiction
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to issue declaratory judgments makes the exercise of that
jurisdiction discretionary.

Thus, the weight that Brillhart gave to

the desire to avoid duplicative proceedings was not counterbalanced
by the unflagging obligation to exercise jurisdiction that was
present in both Will and in Colorado River.
The only point settled by Will was one that had been

A"fa,b

suggested by Colorado River, that the determination of whether to

rr.~
V.~
J}..I

t
• commit
• t e d to th e I( DC I s d'iscretion.
• \.)
say
a f e d era 1 sui't is

~J

Blackmun and the plurality agreed on this point.

P:~~
d'd
·
(Y'i not alter Colora d o River.

•
Justice

Otherwise, Will

·
·
If anything,
five Justices
(Justice

Blackmun and the four Justices in dissent} agreed that the reasoning
in Brillhart did not apply to the situation in Will.
t(

The reasoning

~,

in Will, however, is particularly unsettling since the issue in Will
1

was almost the converse of that in Colorado River.

Although the

MaCarran Act in Colorado River indicated a congressional intent to
defer to the court having prior jurisdiction, the federal plaintiff
in Will sought to have the DC determine a question over which it had
exclusive jurisdiction under the Securities Act.

By finding a stay

proper in this situation, Will undercut the unflagging obligation
Colorado River had recognized.
The issue that Will potentially reopens is the balance a
federal court should strike in determining whether to stay its
action.

The primary interest in favor of exercising jurisdiction is

that Congress' grant of jurisdiction carries with it a mandate to
exercise that jurisdiction when the case is properly before the
court.

This interest is strengthened by the fact that this Court

bas traditionally interpreted jurisdictional grants in this manner

and Congress has not seen fit to correct the courts' longstanding
interpretation.

The strongest interest balanced against this is

that of judicial economy.

I agree with Justice Rehnquist that it

makes little sense to hold two proceedings simultaneously.

However,

the fact that it is uneconomical does not mean that a DC is
justified in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction.

While a federal

court may be justified in not exercising its jurisdiction in
exceptional circumstances, the approach advocated by Cone and the
plurality in Will constitutes a substantial departure from Congress'
directive.

Such a shift in policy is best left in the first

instance to Congress.

Moreover, there seems to be no intervening

consideration that would justify such an abrupt departure from what
Colorado River so recently decided.

-

The second question raised by the parties is whether
~

1

- ~ceptional circumstances ~

#~· ~

~
1/f

sted that would justify the district

t's order staying the litigation.

Four factors are raised:

1)

the federal interest in promoting arbitration; 2) the fact that the
state suit was filed prior to the federal suit; 3) the ability of ,
.
the state court to resolve the case completely; and 4) the need to
discourage forum shopping.
1.

The Federal Interest in the Arbitration Act.
The first factor derives from the United States

Arbitration Act of 1925, 9

u.s.c.

§§

1-14 (1976).

The Arbitration

Act has had somewhat of a strange judicial life, having been
transformed from a remedy applicable only to federal courts to
substantive federal law applicable to the states as well.

The Act,

passed in 1925, was designed to remedy the courts' refusal to

1~-

J.

•

enforce arbitration agreements and to place arbitration agreements

/

on the same footing as other contracts.
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974).

See Scherk v. AlbertoSection 2 of the Act provides

that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract."

Section 3 provides that if any

suit is brought "in any of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration," the court shall stay the action
until the dispute has been arbitrated.

Finally, section 4 provides

that a party aggrieved by the failure of another party to arbitrate
"may petition any United States district court which, save for such
agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, for an order
directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for
in [the arbitration] agreement."
The problem in interpreting the nature of the federal
interest manifested by Congress derives from a disagreement about
the reasons for which the Act was passed.

Although this Court has

implicitly accepted the proposition that Congress was creating a
substantive federal rule, the history of the Act suggests otherwise.
Justice Black's dissent in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood

&

Conklin

Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), argues persuasively that in
enacting the Arbitration Act Congress attempted to create a remedy
which was applicable only in federal courts.

As Justice Black

noted, the drafters of the Act stated repeatedly that "The statute
establishes a procedure in the Federal courts."

See id. at 418.

Congressman Graham explained the Act to the House:

'

'
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"It does not involve any new principle of law except to
provide a simple method ..• in order to give
enforcement •..• It creates no new legislation, grants no
new rights, except a remedy to enforce an agreement in
commercial contracts and in admirality contracts." 65
Cong. Rec. 1931 (1924).
Because Congress was acting prior to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), it does not appear to have been concerned that
providing a federal remedy for arbitration agreements in diversity
cases could have substantive overtones.

This difficulty was

recognized, however, by Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198
(1956).

Bernhardt reasoned that the right to recover was a state

created right, which if enforced through the Arbitration Act could
result in the parties receiving different results in federal and
state forums.

Bernhardt avoided this dilemma by construing the Act

narrowly and finding the Act inapplicable to the contract before it.
Other courts, however, were subsequently faced with the
dilemma Bernhardt recognized.

In Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire

Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (1959), the CA2 avoided this problem by
finding that Congress had not meant to provide a remedy.

Instead,

Congress had intended to enact substantive federal law, which would
provide a federal method of analysis to determine if the contract
were arbitrable.

The result, if not the approach of the CA2 was

adopted by this Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood~ Conklin
Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).

The majority noted the

problem raised in Bernhardt but dismissed it:
"The question in this case, however, is not whether
Congress may fashion federal substantive rules to govern
questions arising in simple diversity cases. Rather, the
question is whether Congress may prescribe how federal
courts are to conduct themselves with respect to subject
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matter over which Congress plainly has the power to
legislate." 388 U.S. at 405 (citations omitted).
The majority found that Congress had this power and upheld the
application of federal contract principles to questions of
arbitrability arising in diversity jurisdiction.
The majority of lower courts appear to have read Prima
Paint as implicitly accepting the holding of Robert Lawrence that
7

Congress intended to create a ~ederal substantive right:

They have,

however, not been able to get around the language and legislative
history of the act which indicate that Congress did not intend the
Act to provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction.

This has

led to the anamoly that a statute providing federal substantive
rights can only be heard when there is an independent basis for
jurisdiction, such as diversity.
Additionally, because this statute provides a substantive
federal right some state courts have considered themselves bound by
the Act.

This is in contrast to even the majority's decision in

Prima Paint, which referred to the Act as applying only to the
federal courts.

This consideration has led to the further anomaly

that§ 3 of the Act, which provides for a stay in any suit brought
in "the courts of the United States," has been interpreted to be
applicable to state courts.

However,§ 4, which provides that a

party may seek to compel arbitration in a "United States district
court," has obviously not been found applicable to the states.
The chequered history of the Act has led to both sides
having colorable claims based on the strength of the federal
interest present.

Cone contends that there can be little federal
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interest in compelling arbitration in a federal court when§ 4 is
applicable only if there is an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction.

Because most agreements containing arbitration

clauses can never be litigated in federal court, there is little
reason to believe that relegating Mercury to its state court
remedies contravenes federal policy.

Indeed,§ 3 of the Act

requires a state court to stay its proceedings if Mercury's claim is
arbitrable.
Mercury responds that§ 4 of the Act gives DCs the
exclusive right to compel arbitration.

To deny Mercury that right

is to defeat an important federal interest.

Although Mercury could

obtain a stay of the state proceedings under§ 3 of the Act in state
court, that fact does not constitute an exceptional circumstance
that would justify staying the federal case.

A state court should

have concurrent jurisdiction over the federal issues before a stay
can even be considered.
Whatever scope Congress intended the Arbitration Act to
have in the first place, as it is currently interpreted it appears
to provide some support for Mercury's position.

That Congress

provided a federal right, albeit a limited one, to compel
arbitration in federal court lends weight to Mercury's claim that
there is a federal interest in not staying the suit.

Certainly,

there is no indication, as there was in Colorado River, that
Congress intended to place a condition on the jurisdiction given
federal courts.

2.

Priority of Filing.

16.

Cone argues that when a state court has obtained
jurisdiction first considerations of comity counsel that a federal
court should refrain from exercising jurisdiction.

Mercury argues

in response that the state court had not obtained jurisdiction since
it had never passed on the merits of the dispute relating to
arbitration. Alternatively, it argues that comity is best served by
allowing a federal court to pass on federal issues.
Cone's comity argument is contrary to the Court's analysis
in Colorado River.

In considering whether the DC had the power to

stay its suit even though abstention was not proper, the Court
stated:
Although this case falls within none of the abstention
categories, there are principles unrelated to
considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and
regard for federal state relations which govern in
situations involving the contemporaneous exercise of
concurrent jurisdictions . . . • " 424 U.S. at 817.
Because the exercise of federal jurisdiction does not prevent the
state court from deciding the case, the primary interest that prior
jurisdiction promotes is prevention of duplicative litigation.

This

interest is strongest when litigation in one forum has proceeded · '
farther than it has in another.

Indeed, if it were clear that one

forum would dispose of the case first then there would be little
reason for the other forum to proceed since the issues would be res
judicata.

In this case, the interest is minimal since neither party

has done anything other than file complaints in either forum.

~-

Piecemeal Ajudication.

17.
Cone contends that deferral was appropriate because the
state court had all the parties--Cone, Mercury and the architect-before it and could proceed to determine the whole controversy.
Because both Cone and the architect were residents of North
Carolina, the lack of complete diversity between the parties means
that the state court is the only forum that can avoid piecemeal
litigation.

Mercury responds that the hospital misstates the issue.
t

,,

The question is whether Cone and Mercury were obligated to arbitrate
Mercury's claims against Cone.

The DC had all the parties before it

necessary to decide that issue.
Because Mercury's claim involves the question of whether
the case should be in court or before an arbitrator, proceeding in
'

the state forum will not advance the suit greatly.

If the case goes

to arbitration and Cone loses, Cone will still have to return to
state court and pursue a separate suit for indemnification against
the architect.
state court.

If Cone wins there will be no need to return to
Alternatively, if either court decides that Mercury's

claim is not arbitrable, proceeding initially in the state court
will be of little advantage since the issue of arbitrability is
largely unrelated to the issues of liability and indemnification.
While switching from the state court to the federal court would be
inconvenient, the differing nature of the claims presented in each
forum minimizes the problem of duplicative litigation.
4.

Forum Shopp~.

-

......

Cone claims that Mercury instituted suit in federal court

oecause it thought it would obtain a preferable outcome.

Mercury

defends its good faith effort and points to Cone's own lack of
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exemplary behavior.

After having negotiated for several months,

Cone filed suit in state court on short notice in order to defeat
Mercury's right to arbitration.
Although each side appears to have sought a forum that
would give it a favorable outcome, it does not seem that this is a
particularly important factor.

Presumably any case raising the

issue of deferral of concurrent jurisdiction will involve two
parties who have sought what each considers the more favorable
forum.

Of greater importance is whether the federal suit raised a

frivilous claim or was clearly instituted as a delaying tactic.
Neither party appears to have engaged in such a tactic.
If this suit arises on direct appeal and the scope of
is abuse of discretion, it seems that the circumstances that
would justify a stay are slight when weighed against a federal
court's obligation to exercise its jurisdiction.

~r~

#r

If Mercury should

. Pave petitioned for mandamus, the case is obviously closer.

The

~ { question becomes whether Mercury had a clear and indisputable right
to proceed in federal court.

Given the slight factors in favor of
,

;

staying the suit, the federal question involved and the obligation
to exercise jurisdiction, a strong case can be made for mandamus.
owever, the problem with such an approach is that it may signal a
elaxation on the use of mandamus.

The risk of mandamus being used

as a substitute for interlocutory appeals seems sufficient to
approve its use only in the narrowest of situations, such as
continued or flagrant abuse of discretion.

Although denying the use

of mandamus in this situation could insulate a DC's decision to stay
a suit, I would prefer to trust the judgment of the DCs than to

19.
expand the scope of mandamus.

Additionally, this case can be

distinguished from the dissent in Will, which would have appproved
the use of mandamus.

In Will, Congress had given the federal

courts' exclusive jurisdiction under the Securities Act of 1934.
Disregard of that express command justified mandamus.

There is no

similar directive in this case.

II.

Appealability of the

~vt~
1
.
Mercury's order, Mercury

cAlf
Stay.

~

When the DC stayed

writ of mandamus and alternatively appeal under 28

sought both a

u.s.c.

§1291.

The court of appeals did not consider whether mandamus were
appropriate.

C4'-f-

Instead, it unanimously found that the order was

effectively final and thus ap ealable.

The court did not discuss

the issue but cited its opinion in Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103
(CA4 1967).

In Amdur, the DC had stayed its proceedings pending

disposition of a related state case.

The court of appeals found

that the stay constituted a final judgment since the plaintiffs
appeared to be barred by a state bond requirement from pursuing
their claims in state court.

Because the litigants in Amdur were

effectively precluded from proceeding in state court, Amdur does not
support the CA's decision squarely.
There are two arguments why the appeal is proper:

the

federal action was effectively final and the stay was appealable as
a collateral order.
Mercury's argument that the stay is effectively final is
qased on the proposition that once the DC stays its order the state
court will proceed to resolve the issues raised.

Because the state
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court's resolution will be res judicata, the proceedings in the DC
will be mooted.

Although it it true that the DC retains the power

to modify its order, there is little reason to believe that it will
do so.
Cone relies on the language in the plurality decision in
Will to argue that a stay differs from a dismissal because the DC
retains the power to modify its order at any time.

Cone notes the

strict construction given the finality requirement in Coopers!_
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437

u.s.

463 (1978), and argues that Mercury's

argument is no more than a death knell argument in disguise.

Like

the death knell argument, Mercury's effective finality argument
requires a case by case determination of finality.

The time

required to determine if the case is final defeats the purpose of
avoiding unnecessary interlocutory appeals.

Finally, Cone argues

that stay order does not constitute the death knell for the entire
suit, since Mercury's claims will be heard in state court.
As a general rule, a suit is final only when the
litigation has ended and there is nothing left to do but execute the
judgment.

See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)

~

,

The cases have recognized, however, that finality is a practical
rather than a technical concept and have found a small class of
cases effectively final.

Stays have generally not been considered

to fall within this small class since a stay normally does not
dispose of the suit but instead merely delays its disposition.

Even

when the stay involves two actions, one federal and the other state,
sourts have continued to apply the rule that a stay is not a final
action.

See Moore's Federal Practice, 110.20(4).

This rule,

however, has been repeated more frequently than it has been
discussed.

Those cases which have discussed it have offered

primarily four justifications.

The first is that a stay is not

final since the state court may not rule on the merits; the state
court may dismiss on a technicality.

See Arny v.

Transportation Co., 266 F.2d 869 (CA3 1959).

Philadelphia

The persuasiveness of

this reasoning depends on a empirical assumption, the probability
that the federal suit will be resumed.

It seems to me that the

probability is extremely low, especially in a stituation in which
the DC has made an informed decision to stay the federal suit.
Presumably one of the reasons the stay was issued in the first place
was because the DC was convinced that the issues could be resolved
in state court.

It is for this reason that the significance of

Coopers!,_ Lybrand is lessened.

Coopers!,_ Lybrand had reasoned that

a case by case determination of whether a suit had been effectively
terminated was too great a burden on judicial administration to
justify allowing appeal when the DC had refused to certify a class.
In considering whether to grant a stay, however, the DC has already
made a case by case analysis.

The DC's determination that a stay is

proper may provide a sufficient basis to say that the stay is fi~al.
A second argument, which is a variation on the first, is
that the DC retains the power to modify its stay.

See Will, supra;

cf. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. v. Scholes, 601 F.2d 1151,
1153-54 (CAlO 1979).

Although the DC does have this power, it again

'

seems highly unlikely that the DC, in the absence of any proceedings
before it, will be given any reason to exercise that power.
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The third argument is that making the stay appealable
defeats one of the purposes which argued in favor of staying the
case in the first instance.
F.2d 377, 380 {CAl 1982).

Cf. Acton Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 670
A stay is often granted to prevent

duplicative proceedings which waste both the courts' and the
litigants' time.

To allow an appeal as a matter of right in such a

situtation simply continues the duplicative litigation that the stay
was designed to prevent.

If this is the reason for not allowing

stays, then it seems that finality is a poor measure to employ.

If

the district court had dismissed Mercury's suit there would be no
question of finality.

Yet, an appeal from a dismissal would defeat

the purpose of the stay to the same extent that an appeal from a
stay would.
The final argument, which is only suggested by the cases,
is that the stay does not end litigation on the matter.

See

Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 (1962)

{stay

by the DC in deference to state courts when no relevant litigation
was pending in state court was final since the appellant was
effectively out of court); Amdur v. Lizars, supra {stay final when '
litigant barred from proceeding in state court).

These cases

suggest that a stay is final only if the state court is unavailable
to continue the inquiry.

Thus, although the stay may be final for

the purposes of the federal forum, it is not final for the purposes
of the entire litigation.
reasoning.

There are two problems with this

The first is that the federal suit is a separate action,

wpich would be appealable if the DC dismissed rather than stayed the
suit.

If the stay of the federal suit is effectively a dismissal,
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the fact that there is a pending state proceeding would not seem to
justify treating the stay any differently than the dismissal.

The

second problem with holding that the entire litigation has not ended
is that deferring to the state suit defeats a litigant's right to a
federal determination.

While deferral within a unitary system does

not defeat a litigant's right to have that system decide his claims,
deferral between two different systems does.
- ~

!/

I find Mercury's arguments persuasive that a stay is

~

effectively a final decision ~and, to the extent that finality is the

~j~

sole measure of ~

:;-

ability, I do not find the other arguments

persuasive reasons for denying Mercury an appeal in this situation.

/

Given these two propositions, it would seem that there are two
possible courses.
final.

w'~"'

The first is to say that the stayed action is

I am hesitant to advocate this position, however, because of

its effect on settled practice, which states that stays within a
unitary system--i.e., the stay of one federal court in deference to

~ an~
~
~

:~?
./

a~

rt or the stay of a federal court in deference to
ncy--a~ ~final. It seems that if a stayed action is

effectively final in a state federal context, it would also be final

when the staying and proceeding courts are in the same system.
- - - - - --,,---.:::_
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to focus on the right that is

-------------

lost in this case, the fight to have a federal court decide a case
~

\

properly before it.

~

\

It is possible to say that a stay in this

the fa t ~

ter~

The test for collateral orders was recently restated in
Firestone Tire

&

Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S 368 (1981):

Z4.

"[T]he order must conclusively determine the disputed
question, resolve an important issue comletely separate
from the merits of the action and be effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Id. at
375.
As in the consideration of effective finality, the most
troubling question is whether the DC's decision is conclusive since
the DC retains the power to change its order.

Prior cases have

stated that a right has not been conclusively determined so long as
the DC retains the right to change its decision.

However, these

cases have arisen in a different setting than the issuance of stay.
See Firestone Tire.!,_ Rubber v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 381 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Coopers.!,_ Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S.
463, 469 (1978); United States v. McDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858-59
(1978).

Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Firestone Tire recognized
)

that the possibility that the DC would change its ruling in that

----

case was not "merely theoretical."

During the course of the trial,

the DC can determine whether the danger posed by allowing a counsel
with a conflict of interest to represent one of the parties would be
actualized.

As events unfold at trial the DC may be given a reason

to reevaluate the correctness of its earlier determination.
Similarly, McDonald found that the denial of a motion to dismiss ~
because the defendant had not been given a speedy trial was not a
collateral order.

It observed that because the alleged prejudice

could become apparent during the trial, there was a significant
possibility that the DC would r.~consider its denial.

Unlike these

two cases, the possibility that the DC will reconsider its stay is
entirely theoretical.

There are no ongoing proceedings that will

9 lert the federal court to the need to reconsider its ruling.

z:,.

The second condition is also satisfied.

The right to have

a federal court exercise its jurisdiction is completely separate
from the merits of an action, and it is a right whose importance has
continually been recognized by this Court.
supra.

See Colorado River,

Finally, there is a substantial possibility that the right

will be unreviewable because the state court proceedings will be res
1
judicata. To my mind, relying on the bollateral order doctrine\~

-------~-----------

presents the best resolution of a close issue .
.
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To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Rives

Re: No. 81-1203, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Company

The complaint filed by Cone in state court alleged that

~----------

arbitration was not required by the contract essentially because

--

Mercury had failed to submit a timely demand for arbitration.

The

complaint stated:
"(15) With regard to each of the claims asserted, Mercury
has not demanded arbitration and has no right under the
contract to have these claims submitted to arbitration.
Mercury's inaction with respect to resolving these claims
in the way and manner required by the contract, its
dilatory conduct, and its failure to make timely demand
for arbitration have resulted in substantial prejudice to
Cone Hospital. Mercury has failed to demand arbitration
within a reasonable time after each claim arose as
required by the contract, has failed to demand arbitration
within the contractual statute of limitations, and has
failed in general to satisfy conditions precedent to
arbitration [submission of the claims to the architect].
Further, Mercury has waived its right to arbitrate and is
barred from submitting these claims to arbitration by
laches and estoppel." JA 24-25.
Paragraph 2.2.10 in the contract required that "Any claim,
dispute or other matter that has been submitted to the Architect ...
shall be subject to arbitration upon the written demand of either
party."

JA 29.

The subject of the dispute appears to have been

within the scope of the arbitration clause.

-------------------------

The disputed issue was

w~ether Mercury had a claim against Cone under the contract for work

9~

~

~ "' ~ ~ s ' ' ~

,,~~~h''

1
2.

/
delays and impact costs.

As the CA found, "the Hospital [cannot]

contest the fact that it has refused to arbitrate the dispute with

cl/-~

Mercury over a matter clearly within the arbitration clause of the
contract."

App. to Pet. for Cert. Al3.

The only indication that

Cone claimed that the subject matter of the dispute was not within
the scope of the arbitration clause occurs in Cone's Response to
Mercury's Petition to Remove the Case to Federal Court.

Mercury had

alleged that it was entitled to enforce Paragraph 2.2.10, the
provision requiring arbitration.

JA 5.

Cone denied "the inference

that paragraph 2.2.10 of the contract applied to the dispute
reflected in the State Court complaint at the time the complaint was
filed."

JA 8.

This denial would seem to have little weight.

The CA discusses the applicable case law that has
developed in the lower courts since Prima Paint v. Flood~ Conklin,
388 U.S. 395.

See App. to Pet. for Cert. A7-Al3.

Under this case

law, the question of whether a party has waived the right to
arbitrate
.., would present an issue to be decided under substantive

-----

federal law.

See, e.g., Halcon International v. Monsanto Australia,

446 F.2d at 160-63.

~f

---

It seems to me that the substantive federal law

question is a quagmire, which should and can be avoided.

North

~

,

Carolina has indicated that it will apply the Federal Arbitration
Act and substantive federal law.
Shaver, 279 S.E.2d 816 (1981).

See Burke County Public Schools v.
Although North Carolina has not

addressed whether substantive federal law requires that issues of
waiver be submitted to the arbitrator, presumably it would follow
the lead of the circuit courts that have addressed this question.
Because federal law would apply in either forum, there would be no

3.

need to consider in this case whether the case should have been sent
back to state court for the state court to decide whether the
contract provided for arbitration.

Moses H. Cone v. Mercury Construction

No. 81-1203
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-1203

MOSES H. CONE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, PETITIONER v. MERCURY CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[January-, 1983]

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, commenced as a petition for an order to compel
arbitration under § 4 of the United States Arbitration Act of
1925 (Arbitration Act or Act), 9 U. S. C. § 4, presents the
question whether, in light of the policies of the Act and of our
decisions in Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976) and Will v. Calvert Fire
Insurance Co., 437 U. S. 655 (1978), the District Court for
the Middle District of North Carolina properly stayed this diversity action pending resolution of a concurrent state-court
suit. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed
the stay. 656 F. 2d 933, rehearing denied, 664 F. 2d 936
7
(1981). We granted certiorari. 41 "" U. S. "~ (1982).
We affirm.
I
Petitioner Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital ("Hospital")
is located in Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondent Mercury Construction Corp. ("Mercury"), a construction contractor, has its principal place of business in Alabama. In July
1975, Mercury and the Hospital entered into a contract for
the construction of additions to the Hospital building. The
contract, drafted by representatives of the Hospital, included
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provisions for resolving disputes arising out of the contract or
its breach. All disputes involving interpretation of the contract or performance of the construction work were to be referred in the first instance to J. N. Pease Associates ("Architect"), an independent architectural firm hired by the Hospital to design and oversee the construction project. With
certain stated exceptions, 1 any dispute decided by the Architect (or not decided by it within a stated time) could be submitted by either party to binding arbitration under a broad
arbitration clause in the contract:
"All claims, isputes and other matters in question
arising out of, or relating to, this Contract or the breach
thereof, . . . shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules
of the American Arbitration Association then obtaining
unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. This
agreement to arbitrate shall be specifically enforceable
under the prevailing arbitration law. The award rendered by the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment
may be entered upon it in accordance with applicable law
in any court having jurisdiction thereof." App. 29-30.
The contract also specified the time limits for arbitration
demands. 2
The Architect was given final say on "matters relating to artistic effect." App. 28-29. The contract also excluded arbitration on any claim
waived by the making or acceptance of final payment. App. 29. Neither
of these exceptions is asserted to apply in this case.
2
The contract provided that no demand for arbitration could be made
later than thirty days after the Architect's written final decision. In the
case of arbitrable disputes not subject to submission to the Architect, the
demand was required to be made "within a reasonable time after the claim
... has arisen," and in no event after the applicable statute of limitations
had run. App. 29--30.
The contract also set a starting time limit for arbitration demands. No
demand could be made earlier than ten days after presentation of evidence
1
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Construction on the project began in July 1975. Performance was to be completed by October 1979. 3 In fact, construction was substantially completed in February 1979, and
final inspections were mad~t~
At a meeting in October 1977, during construction, attended by representatives of Mercury, the Hospital, and the
Architect, Mercury agreed, at the Architect's request, to
withhold its claims for delay and impact costs (i. e., claims for
extended overhead or increase in construction costs due to
delay or inaction by the Hospital) until the work was substantially completed. On this record, the Hospital does not contest the existence of this agreement, although it asserts that
the Architect lacked authority to agree to a delay in presentation of claims or to entertain claims after the contract work
was completed.
In Janua!:Y..-1Jt80, Mercury submitted to the Architect its
claims furdelay 'and impact costs. Mercury and the Architect discussed the claims over several months, substantially
reducing the amount of the claims. According to the Hospital, it first learned of the existence of Mercury's claims in
April 1980; its lawyers assumed active participation in the
claim procedure in May. The parties differ in their characterizations of the events of the next few months-whether
there were "ongoing negotiations," or merely an "investigation" by the Hospital. In any event, it appears from the
record that lawyers for the Hospital requested additional
information concerning Mercury's claims. As a result, on
August 12, 1980, Mercury gave a detailed presentation of its
claims at a meeting attended by Mercury's representatives
and lawyers, the Hospital's representatives and lawyers, and
to the Architect, unless the Architect rendered a written decision before
that time. App. 29.
3
The completion date, originally set as November 14, 1978, was extended to October 1979 by agreement of the parties.
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representatives of the Architect. Mercury agreed to send
copies of its files to an expert hired by the Hospital, and the
parties agreed to meet again on October 13.
On Q_gtobe_r..6, Mercury's counsel telephoned the Hospital's
counsel to confirm that the scheduled meeting would go forward. The Hospital's counsel said he would call back the
next day. When he did, he informed Mercury's counsel that
theHospital would.,E~!;othing on Mer~ y'~ claim. He also
said that thellospital mte naea tofilea decl arafory judgment
action in North Carolina state court.
True to its word, the Hospital filed an action on the morning of October 8 in the Superior Court of Guilford County,
North Carolina, naming Mercury and the Architect as defendants. The complaint alleged that Mercury's claim was
without factual or legal basis and that it was barred by the
statute of limitations. It alleged that Mercury had lost any
right to arbitration under the contract due to waiver, laches,
estoppel, and failure to make a timely demand for arbitration. The complaint also alleged various delinquencies on
the part of the Architect. As relief, the Hospita!._ sought a
declaration th t t ere was no ri ht to arbitration; a stay of
ar 1trat10n; a declaration that the Hospital bore no liability to
Mercury; and a declaration that if the Hospital should be
found liable in any respect to Mercury, it would be entitled to
indemnity from the Architect. The complaint was served on
Mercury on October 9. On that same day, Mercury's counsel
mailed a demand for arbitration.
On October 15, without notice to Mercury, the Hospital obtained an ex parte injunction from the state court forbidding
Mercury to ta.Ke any s teps directed toward arbitration.
Mercury objected, and the stay was dissolved on October 27.
AssoonasUiestay was IITfea , M"ercury filed Uie present action in the District Court, seeking an order compelling arbitration under § 4 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 4. 4

\ ~

~?~

'Simultaneously, Mereury filed a petition fo, ,emova! of the Hospital's
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Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. On the
Hospital's motion, the District Court stayed Mercury's
federal-court suit pending resolution of the state-court suit
because the two suits involved the identical issue of the
arbitrability of Mercury's claims. App. to Pet. for Cert.
A-38.

Mercury sought review of the Distri~ Court's stay by alternative- route~ nofice of appeal ar1Wfr'petition for mandamu~
el of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
heard argument in the case, but before the panel issued any
decision, the Court informed the parties that it would consider the case en bane. After reargument, the en bane
Court held that it had appellate jurisdiction over the case
under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. It reversed the District Court's
stay order and remanded the case to the District Court with
instructions for entry of an order to arbitrate.
-
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Before we address the propriety of the District Judge's
stay order, we must first decide whether that ord~ w~ appealable to the Court of Appeals under 28 ~ C : S1291. 5
7\rercury sought appellate review through two alternative
routes-a notice of appeal under § 1291, and a petition for
mandamus under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651. 6
state-court action. The District Court remanded the removed case on the
ground that, because the Hospital and the Architect are both North Carolina corporations, there was no complete diversity. The propriety of the
removal or remand is not before this Court.
6
Section 1291 provides in relevant part:
"The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, ... except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
6
The Hospital argues that because Mercury's filing in the Court of Appeals was styled a petition for mandamus first and a notice of appeal only
"in the alternative," the Hospital was somehow entitled to have the Court
of Appeals apply the stricter standards of review that obtain under the

81-1203-OPINION
6

MOSES H. CONE HOSPITAL v. MERCURY CONSTR. CORP.

Mercury expressly stated that its appeal was based only on
§ 1291, and not on 18 . S. C. § 1292 (relating to interlocut~1L._~p~ls). The Hospital con ends t at t e order appealeo Fom was not a "final decision" within§ 1291. We disagree and hold that the stay order was final for purposes of
appellate jurisdiction.
Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U. S. 713 (1962), is
instructive in this regard. There the plaintiff brought a federal suit challenging the constitutionality of a state statute.
The District Judge declined to convene a three-judge court
and stayed the~
ral suit under the Pullman abstention
doctrine. 7 We~
hat the District Court's action was final
and therefore reviewable by the Court of Appeals, stating:
"The Court of Appeals properly rejected the argument
that the order of the District Court 'was not final and
hence unappealable under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1291, 1292,'
pointing out that '[a]ppellant was ef£ ctively out of
court."'
Id., at 715, n. 2. 8
..... __.__
mandamus procedure before considering any appeal. Brief for Petitioner
30-31. We do not understand why this order of proceeding would be of
any benefit to the Hospital; but in any event the contention is frivolous.
In the first place, Mercury also filed a proper notice of appeal in the District Court, see Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3(a). More fundamentally , a court
of appeals has no occasion to engage in extraordinary review by mandamus
"in aid of [its] jurisdictio[n]," 28 U. S. C. § 1651, when it can exercise the
same review by a contemporaneous ordinary appeal. See, e.g., Hines v.
D'Artois, 531 F. 2d 726, 732, and n. 10 (CA5 1976).
' Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941).
8
The plaintiff in Idlewild had requested injunctive relief against enforcement of the state statute. Nevertheless, it is clear that neither the
Court of Appeals nor this Court based the holding of appealability on the
argument that the District Court had effectively denied injunctive relief.
See generally 28 U. S. C. § 1292(a)(l); Carson v. American Brands, Inc.,
450 U. S. 79 (1981). Section 1292 in terms applies only to interlocutory
orders, and therefore could hardly have been the basis for a holding that
the orders were "final."
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Here, the argument for finality of the District Court's
order is even clearer-:--Acfistrict court stay pursuant to Pullman abstention is entered with the expectation that the federal litigation will resume in the event that the plaintiff does
not obtain relief in state court on state-law grounds. 9 Here,
by contrast, the District Court predicated its stay order on
its conclusion that the federal and state actions involved "the
identical issue of arbitrability of the claims of Mercury Construction Corp. against the Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-38. That issue of arbitr~bility was the only substantive i,ssue present in tij_e Tederal suit.
Hence, a sta~ederal suitpending resolution of the
state suit meant that there would be no further litigation in
the federal forum; the state court's judgment on the issue
would be res judicata. 10 Thus, here, even more surely than
in Idlewild, Mercury was "effectively out of court." Hence,
as the Court ol'" Appea1s fiela, Hirs stay orcter amounts to a
dismissal of the suit. 11
In any event, if the District Court order was not final for
9

See England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964).
See, e.g., Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F. 2d 1176,
1183--1184 (CAll 1981); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Haydu, 637 F. 2d 391, 397-398 (CA5 1981).
11
See In re Mercury Construction Corp., 656 F. 2d 933, 937-938, and n.
6 (CA4 1981), citing as dispositive Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F. 2d 103, 105-106
(CA41967). See also Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,
597 F. 2d 798,808, and n. 15 (CA2 1979); Baltimore Bank for Cooperatives
v. Farmers Cheese Cooperative, 583 F. 2d 104, 108-109 (CA3 1978); Sun
Oil Co. of Pennsylvania. v. FEA, 572 F. 2d 867 (Temp. Emerg. Ct. App.
1978); Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. Laguna Beach, 547 F. 2d 1092, 1093,
n. 1 (CA9 1976); Hines v. D'Artois, 531 F. 2d 726, 730-732 (CA5 1976);
Drexler v. Southwest Dubois School Corp., 504 F. 2d 836, 838 (CA7 1974)
(en bane); Druker v. Sullivan, 458 F. 2d 1272, 1274, n. 3 (CAl 1972). But
see Acton Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 670 F. 2d 377, 380-382 (CAl 1982); State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Scholes, 601 F. 2d 1151,
1153--1154 (CAlO 1979); Frederick L. v. Thomas, 578 F. 2d 513, 515-516
(CA3 1978) (dictum).
10
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appealability purposes, it was nevertheless appealable within
the exception to the finality rule under Cohen v. Beneficial
Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949). The f actors required to
show finality under this exception have been summarized as
follows:
"To come within the 'small class' of decisions excepted
from the final-judgment rule by Cohen, the order must
conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of
the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment." vCoopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978) (footnote omitted). 12
There can be no dispute that this order meets the second
and third of these criteria. An order that amounts to a refusal to adjudicate the merits plainly presents an important
issue separate from the merits. 13 For the same reason, this
order would be entirely unreviewable if not appealed now.
Once the' state court decided the issue of arbitrability, the
federal court would be bound to honor that determination as
res judicata.
The Hospital contends nevertheless that the District
Court's stay order did not meet the first of the criteria,
namely that it "conclusively determine the disputed question." But this is true only in the-technical sense that every
order short of a final decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the districtjudge. 14 In this case, however, there is
12
Accord, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368, 375
(1981); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U. S. 850, 854-855 (1978); Abney
v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 658--659 (1977).
13
The "completely separate from the merits" requirement is a distillation
of the principle that there should not be piecemeal review of "steps towards
final judgment in which they will merge." Cohen v. Beneficial Loan
Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949). In this case, of course, there is no step
towards final judgment, but a refusal to proceed at all.
14
See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(b); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,
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no basis to suppose that the District Judge contemplated any
reconsideration of his decision to defer to the parallel statecourt suit. He surely would not have made that decision in
the first instance unless he had expected the state court to
resolve all relevant issues adequately. It is not clear why
the Judge chose to stay the case rather than to dismiss it outright; for all that the record shows, there was no reason other
than the form of the Hospital's motion. Whatever the reason, however, the practical effect of his order was entirely
the same for present purposes, and the order was appealable.
See infra, at Part IV E.

III
We turn now to the rinci al issue to be addressed, namely
the propriety of the District ourt's decision to stay this federal suit out of deference to the parallel litigation brought in
state court. Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976) provides persuasive guidance in deciding this question.

1

Fejieral Practice & Procedure § 4478, at 788-792 (1981).
v Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), held that the Cohen
rule did no
1 to a1&lass decertification orde}"because, among other reasons, such an order is m eren y entat1ve under Federal Rule of Civ.
Procedure 23(c)(l), whichprov1aes that s uch an order may be "altered or
amended before the decision on the merits." 437 U. S., at 469, and n. 11.
Of course, as ~ ~ b) Erovides, virtually all interlocutory orders may be
altered or amende efore final judgment if sufficient cause is shown; yet
that does not make all pretrial orders "inherently tentative" in the sense of
that phrase in Coopers & Lybrand. The rationale behind Rule 23(c)(l) is
that a certification decision should be made '11(a]s soon aspractfcahle," even
though later events or discoveries may mandate a different result. Many
other orders, by contrast, are made with the expectation that they will be
the final word on the subject addressed. Certainly that was the case with
the order at issue in this case. Extension oNlie reasoning of Coopers &
Lybrand beyond the context of Rule 23 (c)(l) to c~
s

? ally

would

eliminat,,

th=

~~k,

;:.vt

~

~
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A

Colorado River involved the effect of the McCarran
Amendment, 66 Stat. 560, 43 U. S. C. § 666, on the existence
and exercise of federal-court jurisdiction to adjudicate federal
water rights, 28 U. S. C. § 1345. The Amendment waives
the Government's sovereign immunity to permit the joinder
of the United States in some state-court suits for the adjudication of water rights. In Colorado River, however, the
Government proceeded in Federal District Court, bringing
.suit against some 1,000 nonfederal water users, seeking a
declaration of the water rights of certain federal entities and
Indian tribes. Shortly thereafter, a defendant in that suit
sought to join the United States in a state-court proceeding
for the comprehensive adjudication and administration of all
water rights within the river system that was the subject of
the federal-court suit. The District Court dismissed the federal suit, holding that the abstention doctrine required deference to the state-court proceedings. The Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the suit of the
United States was within the District Court's jurisdiction
under 28 U. S. C. § 1345 and that abstention was inappropriate. We reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
affirmed the judgment of the District Court dismissing the
complaint.
We began our analysis by examining the abstention doctrine in its various forms. We noted:
"Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is
the exception, not the rule. 'The doctrine of abstention,
under which a District Court may decline to exercise or
postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District
Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.
Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the
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State court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.' " 15
After canvassing the three categories of abstention, we concluded that none of them applied to the case at hand. 424
U. S., at 813-817. 16
Nevertheless, we held that the District Court's dismissal
was proper on another ground-one resting not on considerations of state-federal comity or on avoidance of constitutional decisions, as does abstention, but on "considerations of
'[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation
of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.'" 17 We noted that "'the pendency of an action in the
state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction,"' and that the
federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation ... to
exercise the jurisdiction given them." 18 We continued:
"Given this obligation, and the absence of weightier considerations of constitutional adjudication and state-federal relations, the circumstances permitting the dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial
administration are considerably more limited than the
circumstances appropriate for abstention. The former
circumstances, though exceptional, do nevertheless
exist." Id., at 818.
We declined to prescribe a hard and fast rule for dismissals of
5
' Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424
U. S. 800, 813 (1976), quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda
Co., 360 U. S. 185, 18~189 (1959).
16
There is no contention here that any of the categories of the abstention
doctrine apply to this case.
"Colorado River, 424 U.S., at 817, quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v.
C-0-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U. S. 180, 183 (1952).
18
Colorado River, 424 U.S., at 817, quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217
U. s. 268, 282 (1910).
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this type, but instead described some of the factors relevant
to the decision.
"It has been held, for example, that the court first assuming jurisdiction over property may exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. . . . In assessing the appropriateness of dismissal in the event of
an exercise of concurrent jurisd· · n, a federal court
may also consider ch factors I e inconvenience of
the federal forum, e esirability of avoiding piecemeal
litigation; and t
rder in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums. No one factor is necessarily determinative; a carefully considered judgment
taking into account both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the combination of factors counselling against
that exercise is required. Only the clearest of justifications wi,ll warrant dismissal." Id., at 818-819 (emphasis added; citations omitted).

"1

I

As this passage makes clear, the decision whether to dismiss a federal action because of parallel state-court hti ation
does not rest on a mechamca c ec 1s , ut on a careful balancing of ffiei mportant factors as the a1§1 in a ven case,
wi
a ance eav1 y weighted in favor of the exercise of
jurisdiction. The weight to be given to any one factor may
vary greatly from case to case, depending on the particular
setting of the case. Colorado River itself illustrates this
principle in operation. By far the most important factor in
our decision to approve the dismissal there was the "clear
federal policy ... [of] avoidance of iecemeal adjudicationof
water rig s ma river system," i ., at 9, as evmced m the
Mc Carran- Amendment. We recognized that the Amendment represents Congress's judgment that the field of water
rights is one peculiarly appropriate for comprehensive treatment in the forums having the greatest experience and expertise, assisted by state administrative officers acting under
the state courts. Id., at 819-820. In addition, we noted

I
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that other factors in the case tended to support dismissalthe absence of any substantial progress in the federal-court
litigation; the presence in the suit of extensive rights governed by state law; the geographical inconvenience of the federal forum; and the Government's previous willingness to litigate similar suits in state court. Id., at 820.

B
Before discussing the application of Colorado Rivers exceptional-circumstances test, we must address the Hospital's
argument that that test was undermined by our subsequent
decision in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U. S. 655
(1978). We find no merit in this argument for at least two
reasons.
The Hospital relies on the opinion of JUSTICE REHNQUIST,
announcing the judgment of the Court in Calvert and speaking for three other Justices. But it is clear that a majority of
the Justices reaffirmed the Colorado River test in Calvert.
This majority consisted of the four Justices who joined the
dissenting opinion, 437 U. S., at 668-669, 672-674 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), and JUSTICE BLACKMUN who, concurring in the judgment, agreed that Colorado River was controlling, but voted to remand to permit the District Court to
apply the Colorado River factors in the first instance, 19 id., at
667-668. On remand, the Court of Appeals correctly recognized that the four dissenting Justices and JUSTICE BLACKMUN expressed the controlling majority view in this Court's
decision. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will, 586 F. 2d 12
(CA7 1978).
Even on the basis of JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S opinion, there
is an obvious distinction between Calvert and this case. The
key to Calvert was the standard for issuance of a writ of manThe decision in Colorado River came down after the District Court's
stay order in Calvert but before the Court of Appeals issued its mandamus
in that case.
19
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damus under 28 u. s. C. § 1651. 20 As JUSTICE REHNQUIST
stressed, such extraordinary writs are used in aid of appellate jurisdiction only to confine an inferior court to a lawful
exercise of its prescribed authority, or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so. The movant
must show that his right to the writ is clear and indisputable.
437 u. s., at 661-662, 664, 665-666 (opinion of REHNQUIST,
J.). JUSTICE REHNQUIST concluded that that the movant in
Calvert had failed to meet this burden. At the same time, he
noted that the movant might have succeeded on a proper appeal. Id., at 665. In this case we have held that the Court
of Appeals did have appellate jurisdiction; it properly exercised that jurisdiction to find that the District Court's stay
was impermissible under Colorado River.
The Hospital further contends that Calvert requires reversal here because the opinions of JUSTICE REHNQUIST and
JUSTICE BLACKMUN require greater deference to the discretion of the District Court than was given by the Court of Appeals in this case. Under either Calvert or Colorado River,
of course, the decision whether to defer to the state courts is
necessarily left to the discretion of the district court in the
first instance. Yet to say that the district court has discretion is not to say that its decision is unreviewable; such discretion must be exercised under the relevant standard prescribed by this Court. In this case, the relevant standard is
Colorado Rivers exceptional-circumstances test, as eluciThe Court of Appeals in Calvert had held that it lacked jurisdiction to
entertain an ordinary appeal, apparently because a portion of the federal
litigation was the subject of exclusive federal jurisdiction and would therefore remain to be disposed of in federal court after the conclusion of statecourt proceedings. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will, 560 F. 2d 792, 794
(CA7 1977), citing Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Assn., 526 F. 2d
537, 540 (CA3 1975). Cf. Drexler v. Southwest Dubois School Corp., 504
F. 2d 836,838 (CA71974) (en bane) (stay oflitigation pending exhaustion of
state remedies is final under Idlewild). The issue of appellate jurisdiction
was not presented to this Court in Calvert.
20

,,/
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dated by the factors discussed in that case. As we shall now
explain, we agree with the Court of Ap eals that the District
Court in this case a use 1 s 1scre 10n m granting t e stay.
IV
Applyi~ the Qolorado Riv~_factors to this case, it is clear
that there was no showfng of the requisite'€xceptional circumstances'"to justify tfie District Court's stay.
The Hospital concedes t ~ s t two factors mentioned
in Colorado River are not present here. There was no assumption by either court of jurisdiction over any res or property, nor is there any contention that the federal forum was
any less convenient to the parties than the state forum. The
remaining factors-avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and the
order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums-far from supporting the stay, actually counsel against
it.
A

There is no force here to the consideration that was paramount i n ~ River itself-the danger of piecemeal
litigation.
Tliellospital points out that it has two substantive disputes here-one with Mercury, concerning Mercury's claim
for delay and impact costs, and the other with the Architect,
concerning the Hospital's claim for indemnity for any liability
it may have to Mercury. The latter dispute cannot be sent
to arbitration without the Architect's consent, since there is
no arbitration agreement between the Hospital and the Architect. It is true, therefore, that if Mercury obtains an arbitration order for its dispute, the Hospital will be forced to
resolve these related disputes in different forums. That misfortune, however, is not the result of any choice between the
federal and state courts; it occurs because the relevant federal law requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give
effect to an arbitration agreement. 21 Under the Arbitration
21

This provides a sharp contrast with the key statute at issue in Colo-
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Act, an arbitration agreement must be enforced notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the
underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement. 22 If
the dispute between Mercury and the Hospital is arbitrable
under the Act, then the Hospital's two disputes will be resolved separately-one in arbitration, and the other (if at all)
in state-court litigation. Conversely, if the dispute between
Mercury and the Hospital is not arbitrable, then both disputes will be resolved in state court. But neither of those
two outcomes depends at all on which court decides the question of arbitrability. Hence, a decision to allow that issue to
be decided in state rather than federal court accomplishes absolutely nothing in the way of avoiding piecemeal resolution
of disputes.
B
The order in which the concurrent tribunals obtained and
exercised jurisdiction cuts against, not for, the District
Court's stay in this case. The Hospital argues that the stay
was proper because the state-court suit was filed some 19
days before the federal suit. In the first place, this argument disregards the obvious reason for the Hospital's priority in filing. An indispensable element of Mercury's cause of
rado River-the McCarran Amendment. There, as we stressed, the primary policy of the statute was the avoidance of piecemeal litigation. 424
U. S., at 819---820.
'l2 E . g., C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan International Co., 552 F. 2d 1228,
1231-1232 (CA7 1977); Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Industries, Inc., 514
F. 2d 614, 617 (CAI 1975); Hamilton Life Insurance Company of New
York v. Republic National Life Insurance Co., 408 F . 2d 606, 609 (CA2
1969).
In some cases, of course, it may be advisable to stay litigation among the
non-arbitrating parties pending the outcome of the litigation. That decision is one left to the district court (or to the state trial court under applicable state procedural rules) as a matter of its discretion to control its
docket. See generally Landis v. North American Co., 299 U. S. 248,
254-255 (1936).
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action under § 4 for an arbitration order is the Hospital's refusal to arbitrate. See n. 26, infra. That refusal did not occur until less than a day before the Hospital filed itss tate
suit. Hence, Nrercury"""S1mply Ifad no reasonable opportunity
tolDe its § 4 petition first. Moreover, the Hospital succeeded in obtaining an ex parte injunction from the state
court forbidding Mercury from taking any steps to secure arbitration. 23 Mercury filed its § 4 petition the same day that / ~
the injunction was dissolved. 24
/
That aside, the Hospital's priority argument gives too mechanical a reading to the "priority" element of the Colorado
River balance. This factor, as with the other Colorado
River factors, is to be applied in a pragmatic, flexible manner
with a view to the realities of the case at hand. Thus, priority should not be measured exclusively by which complaint
was filed first, but rather in terms of how much progress has
been made in the two actions. Colorado River illustrates
this point well. There, the federal suit was actually filed

rom .

23
Of course we do not mean to say that the state court's injunction could
properly have been applied to prevent Mercury from filing or prosecuting a
federal lawsuit. See General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U. S. 12 (1977);
Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U. S. 408 (1964). Mercury was not
obliged, however, to put itself in danger of contempt sanctions merely in
order to cut short the period of the Hospital's priority of filing.
24
The Court of Appeals, examining the timing and substance of the parties' filings in these cases, found another powerful argument against the
District Court's stay: it concluded that, despite chronological priority, the
Hospital's state-court suit was a contrived, defensive reaction to Mercury's
claim for relief and for arbitration. 656 F. 2d, at 944-945. This was the
primary basis on which the lower courts, on remand from our Calvert decision, decided to continue the stay in that case. Calvert Fire Insurance
Co . v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co., 600 F. 2d 1228 (CA7 1979).
While there is some persuasiveness to this argument, we need not rely on
it. We note only that, at a minimum, Mercury can hardly be accused of
any bad faith tactics in going to the only forum that (it thought) could
be counted on to enforce its federal right to arbitration. See infra, at
Part ND, and nn. 34-35.
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first. Nevertheless, we pointed out as a factor favoring dismissal "the apparent absence of any proceedings in the District Court, other than the filing of the complaint, prior to the
motion to dismiss." 424 U. S., at 820. Here, the opposite
was true. It was the state-court suit in which no substantial
proceedings (excepting only the abortive temporary injunction) had taken place at the time of the decision to stay. In
the federal suit, by contrast, the parties had taken most of
the steps necessary to a resolution of the arbitrability issue. 25
In realistic terms, the federal suit was running well ahead of
the state suit at the very time that the District Court decided
to refuse to adjudicate the case.
This refusal to proceed was lainly erroneous in view of
Congress s c ear m en , in the Arbitra 10n ct to move the
part~
ble dispute out of court and into :rtitration as qmc y and eas1 y as possible. The Act provides two
parallel devices for enforcing an arbitration agreement: a
stay of litigation in any case raising a dispute referrable to
arbitration, 9 U. S. C. § 3, and an affirmative order to engage
in arbitration, § 4. Both of these sections call for an expeditious and summary hearing, with only restricted inquiry
into factual issues. 26 Assuming that the state court would
Under§ 6 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 6, Mercury's application
for a § 4 order was properly treated procedurally as a motion. Mercury
submitted affidavits, legal briefs, and documentary evidence in support of
the order sought. The Hospital responded with full briefing and extensive
evidentiary submissions on the arbitrability issue, and it requested oral argument and a jury trial. At the same time, it made its successful motion
for a stay. It is readily apparent that if the District Court had denied the
stay, it doubtless could and should have gone on to decide the arbitrability
point in very short order.
26
Section 3 provides that if a suit is brought on the merits of a dispute
covered by an arbitration agreement,
"the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the
action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
25
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have granted prompt relief to Mercury under the Act, 27 there
still would have been an inevitable delay as a result of the
District Court's stay. The stay thus frustrated the statutory
policy of rapid and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration
agreements.
C
Besides the four factors expressly discussed in Colorado
River, there is another that emerges from Calvert-the fact
that federal law rovides the rule of decision on the merits.
The sta e-versus-federal- aw ac or was o ambiguous relevance in Colorado River.'lll In Calvert, however, both the
four-vote dissenting opinion and JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S opinion concurring in the judgment pointed out that it is ordinaril ina ropriate to defer to state courts for the resolution
of rights u~
e ~ a-E;w, especia ly w ere e era Jurisdiction over the claims at stake is exclusive. 437 U. S., at 667
the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration." 9 U. S. C. § 3.
Section 4 provides that a district court must enter an order to arbitrate
"upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or
the failure to comply therewith is not in issue." If either of these points is
in issue, § 4 provides that "the court shall proceed summarily" to a trial on
that point. Section 6 further provides that a request for relief under either § 3 or § 4 is to be treated procedurally as a motion.
Moreover, the policy of the Arbitration Act requires a liberal reading of
arbitration agreements, see infra, at 19-20. As a result, some issues that
might be thought relevant to arbitrability are themselves arbitrable-further speeding the procedure under §§ 3 and 4. See, e. g., Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395 (1967).
27
See n. 33, infra; but cf. nn. 34-35, infra.
28
The federaVstate law point was of little guidance in Colorado River for
two reasons. First, there was an affirmative policy in federal law expressly approving litigation of federal water rights in state court-the
McCarran Amendment. Second, although the water rights of the United
States and the Indian tribes were governed in part by federal law, the bulk
of the litigation would necessarily revolve around the state-law water
rights of the thousand nonfederal parties in the case-a factor on which we
expressly relied in approving the District Court's stay. 424 U. S., at 820.
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(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in the
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting). See

judgment); id., at 668-677
also Colorado River, 424
U. S., at 815, n. 21; McNeese v. Board of Education, 373
u. s. 668, 672-674 (1963).
The basic issue presented in Mercury's federal suit was the
arbitrablhty of ffie diiwute between Mercury and the Hospital. Federal law in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs
fA_,,h-, that issue in either state or fe era court. ec 10n 2 1s the
-{
primary substantive provision o the Act, declaring that a
written agreement to arbitrate "in any maritime transaction
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract." 9 U. S. C. § 2. 29 Section 2 is a congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural p<icies to the contrary. The effe t of the section is to
v1fa-. create a o y o e era substantive aw o ar 1tra 11ty, apQ
1 ration a
ent wit!infffi'e coverage of
/ plicab e o an
the Act.
Prima Paint orp. . Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Corp., 388 U. S. 395 (1967),
example, the parties had
signed a cont
· mg an arbitration clause, but one
party alleged that there had been fraud in the inducement of
the entire contract (although the alleged fraud did not go to
the arbitration clause in particular). The issue before us was
whether the issue of fraud in the inducement was itself an arbitrable controversy. We held that the language and policies of the Act required the conclusion that the fraud issue is
arbitrable; we re· ected a contrary rule that arbitrability:~
(
governed by state-law ru es o contract inter etation. I'd.,
at 4
4.
t oug our oldmg m Prima Paint extended
only to the specific issue presented, the courts of appeals
have since consistently concluded that questions of
29
"Maritime transaction" and "commerce" are defined in § 1 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 1.

I
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arbitrability must be addressed with a health
or the
federal policy favormg ar 1tration.
e agree. Any doubts
concernmg the scope of ar itrable isslreSShould be resolved
in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability. 30
To be sure, the source-of-law factor has less significance
here than in Calvert, since the federal courts' jurisdiction to
enforce the Arbitration Act is concurrent with that of the
state courts. 31 But we emphasize that our task in cases such
as this is not to find some substantial reason for the exercise
of federal jurisdiction by the district court; rather, the task is
80
E.g., Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F. 2d 638, 643 (CA7
1981); Wick v. Atlantic Marine, Inc., 605 F. 2d 166, 168 (CA5 1979);
Becker Autoradio U. S. A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.
2d 39, 43--45 (CA3 1978); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 174 U. S. App. D. C.
253, 266, 531 F. 2d 585, 598 (1976); Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Industries,
Inc., 514 F. 2d 614, 616-617 (CAl 1975); Germany v. River Terminal R.
Co., 477 F. 2d 546, 547 (CA61973); Coenen v. R. W. Pressprich & Co., 453
F. 2d 1209, 1211-1212 (CA2), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 949 (1972); Hart v.
Orion Insurance Co., 453 F. 2d 1358, 1360-1361 (CAlO 1971).
31
See n. 33, infra.
The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federalcourt jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does
not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) or otherwise. Section 4 provides for an order
compelling arbitration only when the federal district court would have jurisdiction over a suit on the underlying dispute; hence, there must be diversity of citizenship or some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction
before the order can issue. E.g., Commercial Metals Co. v. Balfour,
Guthrie, & Co., 577 F. 2d 264, 26S--269 (CA5 1978), and cases cited. Section 3 likewise limits the federal courts to the extent that a federal court
cannot stay a suit pending before it unless there is such a suit in existence.
Nevertheless, although enforcement of the Act is left in large part to the
state courts, it nevertheless represents federal policy to be vindicated by
the federal courts where otherwise appropriate.
We need not address whether a federal court might stay a state-court
suit pending arbitration under 28 U. S. C. § 2283.
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to ascertain whether there exist "exceptional" circumstances,
the "clearest of justifications," that can suffice under Colorado River to justify the surrender of that jurisdiction. The
mere fact that state law governs the merits is not alone
enough to warrant that surrender; whereas the fact that federal law governs should be a major consideration militating
against it. 32
D
Finally, in this case an important reason against allowing a
stay is the probable inadequacy of the state-court proceeding
t o ~ " t i t s . ' We areriotto 6e un<ferstooa £o
impeach the competence or procedures of the North Carolina
courts. Moreover, state courts, as much as federal courts,
are obliged to grant stays of litigation under § 3 of the Arbitration Act. 33 It is less clear, however, whether the same
is true of an order to compel arbitration under § 4 of the Act. 34
Cf. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co.,
600 F. 2d 1228 (CA7 1979) (appeal after remand from this Court), approving a stay where the supposed federal claim brought in federal court was
"contrived." See also n. 24, supra.
33
Although § 3 refers ambiguously to a suit "in any of the courts of the
United States," the state courts have almost unanimously recognized that
the stay provision of § 3 applies to suits in state as well as federal courts,
requiring them to issue the same speedy relief when a dispute is referrable
to arbitration. (The North Carolina Supreme Court has so held, although
not until after the District Court ordered this stay. Burke County Public
Schools Board of Education v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408, 279 S.E.
2d 816 (1981).) This is necessary to carry out Congress's intent to mandate enforcement of all covered arbitration agreements; Congress can
hardly have meant that an agreement to arbitrate can be enforced against a
party who attempts to litigate an arbitrable dispute in federal court but not
against one who sues on the same dispute in state court. See also Prima
Paint, 388 U. S., at 404.
84
Section 4, unlike § 3, speaks only of a petition to "any United States
district court." Nonetheless, at least one state court has held that§ 4 does
require state courts to issue § 4 orders to arbitrate where the section's conditions are met. Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 67
Cal. App. 3d 19, 24-25, 136 Cal. Rptr. 378, 380-381 (1977).
32
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We need not resolve that uestion here; it suffices to say that
there was, a a mm1mum, substantial room for doubt that
Mercury coulaobtafn from the state courfan order compelling e ospital o arb1tra e.
n many cases, no doubt, a
§ 3 stay is q u ~ to protect the right to arbitration.
But in a case such as this, where the party opposing arbitration is the one from whom payment or performance is sought,
a s_tay of liti@tion aloEe is not__enough. It leaves the recalcitrapt part~ee to s1tana ao nothing-ne1tlier fo hfagate nor
to arbitrate. lf tne state courtstayed litigation pending arbitration but declined to compel the Hospital to arbitrate,
Mercury would have no sure way to proceed with its claims
except to return to federal court to obtain a § 4 order-a
pointless and wasteful burden on the supposedly summary
and speedy procedures prescribed by the Arbitration Act.
E
The Hospital argues that the Colorado River test is somehow inapplicable because in this case the District Court
merely stayed the federal litigation rather than dismissing
the suit outright, as in Colorado River. It contends that
Mercury remains free to seek to reopen the federal suit on a
showing that the state suit has failed to adjudicate its rights,
As a historical matter, there was considerable doubt at the time of the
District Court's stay that the North Carolina court would have granted
even a § 3 stay of litigation. The then-controlling precedent in North Carolina was to the effect that a contract such as that between Mercury and
the Hospital was not subject to the Arbitration Act at all, on the reasoning
that a construction project is not "commerce" within the meaning of §§ 1
and 2 of the Act. Burke County Public Schools Board of Education v.
Shaver Partnership, 46 N.C. App. 573, 265 S.E. 2d 481 (1980); BryantDurham Electric Co. v. Durham County Hospital Corp., 42 N.C. App.
351, 256 S.E. 2d 529 (1979). The North Carolina Supreme Court has, however, since repudiated those decisions. Burke County Public Schools
Board of Education v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408, 279 S.E. 2d 816
(1981).
86

81-1203-OPINION
24 MOSES H. CONE HOSPITAL v. MERCURY CONSTR. CORP.

and that a stay is less onerous than a dismissal. We have
already rejected this distinction, for purposes of this case, in
discussing appellate jurisdiction. Supra, at 8-9. We reject
it in this context for the same reasons.
We have no occasion in this case to decide whether a dismissal or a stay should normally be the preferred course of
action when a district court properly finds that Colorado
River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424
U. S. 800 (1976) counsels in favor of deferring to a parallel
state court suit. We can say, however, that a stay is as
much a refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction as a dismissal.
When a district court decides to dismiss or stay under Colorado River, it presumably concludes that the parallel statecourt litigation will be an adequate vehicle for the complete
and prompt resolution of the issues between the parties. If
there is any substantial doubt as to this, it would be a serious
abuse of discretion to grant the stay or dismissal at all. See
supra, at Part IV D; McNeese v. Board of Education, 373
U. S. 668, 674-676 (1963). Thus, the decision to invoke Colorado River necessarily contemplates that the federal court
will have nothing further to do in resolving any substantive
part of the case, whether it stays or dismisses. See 17 C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4247, at 517-519 (1978).
Moreover, assuming that for some unexpected reason the
state forum does turn out to be inadequate in some respect,
the Hospital's argument fails to make out any genuine difference between a stay and a dismissal. It is true that Mercury
could seek to return to federal court if it proved necessary;
but that would be equally true if the District Court had dismissed the case. It is highly questionable whether this this
Court would have approved a dismissal of a federal suit in
Colorado River (or in any of the abstention cases, see supra,
at 10-11) if the federal courts did not remain open to a dismissed plaintiff who later demonstrated the inadequacy of
the state forum.
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V
In addition to reversing the District Court's stay, the
Court of Appeals decided that the underlying co:g_tractual dispute between ~ h e Ros ital rs arbitrabTe under
t e
1tra 10n ct an the terms of e parties' arbitration
agreement. It reversed the District Court's judgment and
remanded the case "with instructions to proceed in conformity herewith." 656 F. 2d, at 946. In effect, the Court of
Appeals directed the District Court to enter a § 4 order to
arbitrate.
In this Court, the Hospital does not contest the substantive correctness o
e ou o
ea s s o din on
ar 1tra 1 ity. It does raise several objections to the proced
he Court of Appeals used in considering and deciding
this case. We are not dis osed to disturb the Court's discretion in its nandling of
case. 8
. 2106 gives the
co s o appeals some latitude in entering an order to
achieve justice in the circumstances. The Arbitration Act
calls for a summary and speedy disposition of motions or petitions to enforce arbitration claus~-=;t:rhe Court of Appeals
ub · ions from both parties
had full briefs and evidenti
on the merits of arbit · 1ty, and held that there were no disputed issues of
requiring a jury trial before a § 4 order
could iss . Under these circumstances, the Court acted
wit · s authority in deciding the legal issues presented in
er to facilitate the prompt arbitration that Congress

.;§u.punu <!Jcmrl af t4t ~th ~fattg
. .aa-ftmghm. ~. QJ. 20,;rJ!'
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

December 29, 1982
Re:

No. 81-1203

Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
v. Mercury Construction Corporation

Dear Bill:
In due course I will circulate a dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

.:§u.vunu <!Jonrt of tqt ~tb .:§taus
'lllas-qittgfon, ;ia. <!J. 20ffeJ!;l
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

December 29, 1982

. 'I
','

·,'

-

Re:

No. 81-1203 - Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

--r:Jll.
TM.
Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

drk 12/29/82

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Rives

Re: No. 81-1203, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Company

I have no problems with Justice Brennan's treatment of the
main issue presented by the case, whether the DC should have stayed
its action in deference to the pending state court proceeding.
have a couple of problems with subsidiary issues:

I do

the opinion's

treatment of finality (pp. 5-9), its treatment of the Arbitration
Act (pp. 19-22), and its approval of the CA4's action on the merits
(p.

25).

1.

Finality
I would have preferred to see the opinion restrict the

discussion of finality to the collateral order doctrine announce9 ,in
Cohen.

Holding that the stay order was itself final since the

litigants were "effectively out of court" may invite more litigation
over whether particular ~

s were themselves final.

On this

point, I would note that Idlewild Liquor Corp. is not persuasive
authority.

What the opinion casts as a holding is a footnote to a

-------~-----------

per curiam opinion.

2.

With respect to the opinion's discussion of the collateral
order doctrine, I have some problem with its treatment of the second
prong of the Cohen test.

It states that "[a]n order that amounts to

a refusal to adjudicate the merits plainly presents an important
issue separate from the merits."

I would think that many orders

refusing to adjudicate the merits may not amount to "important"
issues separate from the merits.

A DC may refuse to adjudicate the

merits because it finds that the issue was not raised in the
complaint or may refuse to amend the complaint to include an issue.
I would be loath to say that these are the type of issues that are

-------------~-----------------'Rather

final for purposes of the collateral order doctrine.

than

announce a broad principle, it would seem less disruptive to say
that in this case, the right to an adjudication in a federal forum
is the "important issue" that is resolved by the DC's action.

--

I also am troubled by the opinion's limitation of Coopers

--

& Lybrand in note 14 to class decertification orders.

I find the

reasoning in Coopers a salutory effort to avoid making every
decision by the DC a final order for purposes of §1291.

I would not

treat Coopers as the exception to the rule of finality.

Instead, it

would seem that this case should be the exception to Coopers.

B.

The Arbitration Act
The scope of the Arbitration Act is a difficult question

that is clouded by this Court's ambiguous decision in Prima Paint.

----

I am not sure that, in ligh b of Prima Paint, the opinion's
discussion of the Act is necessarily incorrect.
seem, however, unnecessary to the decision.

Its discussion does

Since the North

3.

Carolina courts state that they would apply the Federal Arbitration
Act, there is no consideration, such as the application of state
contract law by state courts, that would cut in favor of the DC's
cision to sta;_ the suit.

J(

Because the parties concede that federal

f-

law would apply, the application of federal law favors resolution in
~

-~ der : 1 _i orum.

T~e opinion need not go any further.

Rather than

give this Court's imprimatur to the veiled suggestion in Prima<Paint
\.'

that the~~ rbitration Act creates federal contract law, I would

~-

,

prefer to wait until the issue is presented squarely.

C.

Approval of the CA4' s discuss ion on the merits {

(/J ~ -

f'

2.~

The only issue appealed to the CA4 was whether the DC
abused its discretion in staying Mercury's suit to compel
arbitration.

not only discussed this issue but also reached
extended discussion.

The

excessive to me and best left unmentioned.
pinion instead reaches out and approves the CA4's action.

The

Both the

action and the opinion's approval of it seem unnecessary.

C!fltttrt of fqt ~nitth ,§tait,tt
~ iurltmgt on, ~. C!f • 2.ll ffe J!. ~

~u.prttnt
CHAMBERS 01'

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

January 4, 1983

No. 81-1203

Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
v. Mercury Construction Corp.

Dear Bill,
I will await the dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan

Copies to the Conference

•

/

.§uvrtmt QJottrl o-f tqt~tb .§taftg

~Itm¢on. ~- QJ. 20ffeJl.~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

January 4, 1983

Re:
81-1203
Moses
H.
Cone
Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation

Dear Bill,
I agree.

qy~

Sincerely yours,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
cpm

,,

January 4, 1983
.\i:;_

·./

-~:u-,_ .
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'

Dear Bill:
I agree with your holding ana most of your

opinion.

.

:t.l:

-''·$

'
,:
,fl;'

,._.,.

J.·

I do have a couple of concPrns. On the finality
issue, I have thought that the collateral order doctr'ne
announced in Cohen was all we need rely on. I am inclined
to agree in this case that under the state court's order,
Mercury was "effectively out of court". But expre~sing this
view may invite future litigation as to whether particular
orders were final. Idlewild Liquor Core. really did not
focus on thi~ question except offhandedlv in a single
footnote.

,'fl{_;

In Part II, you conclude inn. 11 with a discussion of Coopers & Lybrand. The final sentencP. in the footnote can be read as limiting the reasoning of that case to
class decertification orders. I would think that it is unwise - certainly it is unnecei:Jl=;J:\J:'V - to Umi t Coooers' reasoning to class decertification or~ers. Putting lt differently, I would not like to say in this case that Coopers
created an exception to the rule of finality. Inceed, one
could view this case as an exception to Coopers. Perhaps
you could omit the final sentence or have it say: "Accordingly, the reasoninq of Coopers & Lybrand is inappl i.cable".
In Part II-C (p. 20) the sentence beginning seven
lines from the bottom of the page ("We held that • • • ") may
be read more broanly than perhaps we would intend. It suggests that all matters pertaininq to arbitrability under the
federal Act are governed by a federal law of contracts.
Since normally interpretation of contracts remains a state
'law matter, it wonld helo me if you simplv omitted the portion of the sentence following the semicolon. This is all
we really need say here.

•
<-,·'

1'1
1'

2.

Finally, Bill, Part V ~ecides here the substantive
issue of arbitrability. As the only issue appealed to CA4
was whether the DC abused its discretion, I suppose that
normally we would simply remand on the merits of the controversy. For the reasons you state, however., I agree that we
are justified in disposing of the merits. What would you
think of a~ding, however, the following at the end of the
second sentence in the second paragraph on page 25:
"The only issue appealed to CA4 was whether
the DC abused its discretion in staying Mercury's sujt to compel arbitration. As we
affirm on thiq issuP, normally we would remand on the mertis of availability. But we
are not disposed to disturb the discretion of
the Court of Appeals in its disposition of
this ca~e."
'Nj

q,

I do not think the foregoing suggestions, if
acceptable, woulcl affect ln any way the excellence of your
opinion that I expect to join .

;i""~-r

'

1·. t

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

January 5, 1983

Re:

Moses Cone Hospital v. Mercury, No. 81-1203

Dear Lewis:
Thank you for your helpful letter concerning my
first draft in the above case.

While I am not yet

settled whether I agree with all of your proposed
- changes, I may well decide to do as you suggest.

For

now, however, let me share with you my reservations about
some of them.
It is probably true, as you say, that Idlewild dealt
with finality offhandedly.

Nonetheless, several Circuits

have accepted Idlewild as authority for a per se rule
that abstention orders and similar stays (such as
exhaustion and Colorado River stays) are final.
Offhanded or not, I think Idlewild's rule is sound and
ought to be non-offhandedly reaffirmed by us.

Perhaps

your concerns about future litigation can be allayed by
including language limiting our Idlewild discussion to
abstention and close analogs thereof.

Indeed, such a

bright-line rule seems less likely to foster future
litigation than reliance on the Cohen doctrine, muddied
as the latter is by Coopers & Lybrand.

-2-

Turning to that case, and to footnote 14 on pp. 8-9:
I am nearly as reluctant to expand Coopers
you are to limit it.

&

Lybrand as

I agree that the reasoning of

Coopers might well be applied outside the narrow Rule 23
context--to many discovery orders, for example.

Yet I

have some difficulty in seeing _how best to do so without
consuming the entire Cohen doctrine in the process.
Would it meet your objections to substitute the following
for the final sentence?

"The reasoning of Coopers

&

Lybrand does not reach all pretrial orders that are
formally subject to revision, b~t only those as to which
some revision might reasonably be expected in the
ordinary course of litigation."
Concerning the discussion on page 20:

It is true

that interpretation of contracts is ordinarily a matter
of state law.

But that is not always so--the best

counterexample being collective bargaining agreements,
which are interpreted as a matter of federal labor law.
My understanding is that, at least to some limited
extent, the same is true of arbitration clauses in
contracts that are within the coverage of the Arbitration
Act.

Several of the cases cited in my footnote 30 say so

explicitly.

Indeed, I think the remainder of the

paragraph in question makes that clear.

To hold, as we

did in Prima Paint, that "the language and policies of
the Act required the conclusion that the fraud issue is

-3-

arbitrable" {p. 20) is necessarily to hold that the
arbitrability issue is governed by federal law: we did
indeed reject the contrary 1st Circuit rule that state
I

i

..

law governed the point.

See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395,

"· ·.i

402-03.

The rest of the paragraph in my draft {pp. 20-

21) goes on to describe the rule governing such questions
generally:
"[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with
a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration . . . • Any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability."
'\

That is itself the statement of a federal substantive
rule: I am not sure why we should not say so directly.
In Part V, I think you and I may have understood
CA4's disposition differently.

Certainly it was not my

intention that we should decide the substantive issue of
arbitrability: indeed, I made a point of saying that
arbitrability itself was not an issue properly before us.
My understanding was that the CA4 has already decided
that issue definitively, see App. to Pet. for Cert. at
A6-Al3, and I think that its decision should stand,
absent some procedural impropriety.

However, I think

something along the lines of your suggested addition
would add clarity.

Would you agree to the following

-4-

sentences in place of the present third sentence of the
second paragraph?
"In particular, it points out that the only issue
formally appealed to the Court of Appeals was the
propriety of the District Court's stay order.
Ordinarily, we would not expect the Court of Appeals to
pass on issues not decided in the District Court. In
the present case, however, we are not disposed to
disturb the Court's discretion in its handling of the
case in view of the special interests at stake and the
apparent lack of any prejudice to the parties."
Again, I appreciate your comments, and I look
forward to your reaction.
Sincer~ly,

/!;;!
Justice Powell

I

I

I

l

·I

I
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w ...

J. BRENNAN, JR.

January 5, 1983
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~
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Re:

Moses Cone Hospital v. Mercury, ~o. 81-1203

~1~~
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Dear Lewis:
Thank you for your helpful letter concerning my
first draft in the above case.

While I am not yet

settled whether I agree with all of your proposed
changes, I may well decide to do as you suggest.

For

now, however, let me share with you my reservations about
some of them.
It is probably true, as you say, that Idlewild dealt
with finality offhandedly.

Nonetheless, several Circuits

have accepted Idlewild as authority for a per se rule
that abstention orders and similar stays (such as
exhaustion and Colorado River stays) are f.lnal.
Offhanded or not, I think Idlewild's rule is sound and
ought to be non-offhandedly reaffirmed by us.

Perhaps

-

your concerns about future litigation can be allayed by
including language limiting our Idlewild discussion to
abstention and close analogs thereof.

Indeed, such a

bright-line rule seems less likely to foster future
ljtigation than reliance on the Cohen doctrine, muddied
as the latter is by Coopers & Lybrand.

-2-

Turning to that case, and to footnote 14 on pp. 8-9:
I am nearly as reluctant to expand Coopers
you are to limit it.

&

Lybrand as

I agree that the reasoning of

Coopers might well be applied outside the narrow Rule 23
context--to many discovery orders, for example.

Yet I

have some difficulty in seeing how best to do so without
consuming the entire Cohen doctrine in the process.
would it meet your
objections to substitute the following
._
~

for the final sentence?

"The reasoning of Coopers

&

Lybiand does not reach all pretrial orders that are
formally subject to revision, but only those as to which
some revision might reasonably be expected in the
ordinary course of litigation."

' .

Concerning the discussion on page 20:

It is true

~

<.

that interpretation of contracts is ordinarily a matter
of state law.

But that is not always so--the best

counterexample being collective bargaining agreements,
which are interpreted as a matter of federal labor law.
My understanding is that, at least to some limited
extent, the same is true of arbitration clauses in

,,'

·,

contracts that are within the coverage of the Arbitration
Act.

Several of the cases cited in my footnote 30 say so

'·

,,.

explicitly.

Indeed, I think the remainder of the

paragraph in question makes that clear.

To hold, as we

dfd in Prima Paint, that "the language and policies of
the Act required the conclusion that the fraud issue is

'

-3-

arbitrable" (p. 20) is necessarily to hold that the
arbitrability issue is governed by federal law; we did
indeed reject the contrary 1st Circuit rule that state
law governed the point.
402-03.

See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395,

The rest of the paragraph in my draft (pp. 20-

21) goes on to describe the rule governing such questions
generally:
"[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with
a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration •••• Any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be . resolved in favor of
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability."
That is itself the statement of a federal substantive

..
.

rule; I am not sure why we should not say so directly.

'(

<

In Part V, I think you and I may have understood
CA4's disposition differently.

Certainly it was not my

intention that we should decide the substantive issue of
arbitrability; indeed, I made a point of saying that
arbitrability itself was not an issue properly before us.

~
'•

'•,

. '

My understanding was that the CA4 has already decided
that issue definitively, see App. to Pet. for Cert. at
A6-Al3, and I think that its decision should stand,
absent some procedural impropriety.

However, I think

something along the lines of your suggested addition
would add clarity.

would you agree to the following

'

.. ,.

~r
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:

sentences in place of the present third sentence of the
second paragraph?
"In particular, it points out that the only i ssue
formally appealed to the Court of Appeals was the
propriety of the District Court's stay order.
Ordinarily, we would not expect the Court of Appeals to
pass on issues not decided in the District Court. In
the present case, however, we are not disposed to
disturb the Court's discretion in its handling of the
case in view of the special interests at stake and the l
apparent lack of any prejudice to the parties."
Again, I appreciate your comments, and I look
forward to your reaction.
Sincei~ly,

~
Justice Powell

1\
;

~-~.

drk 01/06/83

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Rives

Re: No. 81-1203, Moses Cone Hospital v. Mercury Construction Co.

The two specific changes proposed by Justice Brennan seem
fine to me.

The proposed ~

nge in footnote 14 will not restrict

Coopers & Lybrand automatically to the context of Rule 23, but to
situations in which the orders will be subject to future revision.
~

Similarly, the proposed change to part V appears to satisfy the
concerns expressed in your letter.
While I would be happier if the opinion relied solely on

v

the Cohen doctrine, Justice Brennan states that he will draft
language limiting the discussion of Idlewild to abstention cases to
create a "bright line rule."

Because it seems that certainty is a

high value in determining what orders are final, this suggestion·
seems acceptable to me.
The more troublesome point is Justice Brennan's reluctance
to make your suggested change in his discussion of the Arbitration
Act.

The disputed phrase seems unnecessary to his argument since,

as he points out, the remainder of the paragraph makes clear that
"questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard
for the federal policy favoring arbitration."

Having stated the

general principle, there is no need to state a broad rule that

2•

"arbitrability is [not] governed by state-law rules of contract
interpretation."

Rather, the lower courts should be left to apply

the general principle on a case by case basis.

The difference seems

one of emphasis and the results indeed may be the same whether the
phrase is included or not.

It seems, however, that the omission of

the phrase leaves the lower courts freer to explore the application
of the principle.
My recommendation is to accept Justice Brennan's suggested
changes, including the bright line limitation on Idlewild.

Would a

join with a separate letter explaining why you would prefer that he
drop the phrase in the Arbitration Act section be effective in
achieving what you want.

Moses Cone

Dear Bill:
~·

!Jr.•

:J I appreciate your willingness to make the changes
indicate~ 1 n your letter of January 5.
-~
Your proposed changes
satisfactory. The same is true
tion of limiting the discussion
and analogous cases to create a

' ,. 't ''\; '
;,,,

.

,.

'

.,.,

f

'

I still hope you will consider omitting the phrase
I mentioned in your discussion of the Arbitration Act. It
seems unnecessary, as the remainner of the paragraph (as you
note) makes clear that "questions of arbitrability must be
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy fa- ,
voring arbi..tration".
.
'w.~ :_

~
,)"

:'i

in fn. 14 and in Part V are
with respect to your sugges- ·
of Idlewil<l to abstention
"bright line rule".

"~
;;,,,;

l'.

.i\
'ill'

Having stated this general principle, there is no
need to state a broad rule "that arbitrability is [not] governed by state law rulesof contract interpretation". Would
it not be well to allow the courts to apply the general
principle on a case-by-case basis.
I nevertheless think you have a fine oplnion, and
have sent you separately a join note.
Sincerely,

,,

,'January

Rl-1203 Moses Cone Hospital v . Mercury

Bill:

join me.
Sinceri=-ly,

lfp/s~
cc:
;,.l''

I

<

,£,._

,ju.ptmtt <4aurt af flrt ~ h _itattg
,ru~ J. <4. 21lffe~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

January 7, 1983
Re:

Moses Cone Hospital v. Mercury, No. 81-1203

Dear Lewis:
Thank you once again for your letter and your join. On
reflection, I have decided to adopt your suggested change to
my discussion of Prima Paint. A circulation incorporating
these and other changes will be around shortly.

Sincerely,

(~
WJB,Jr.
Justice Powell

"'": The Chief Justice
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell ~/
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

STYLISTIC CHANGES THROUGHOUT.
SEE PAGES: 7-f /?-It Ji/ 21- 22_ 2'!-2;;"
,,A)IIJ ;=oo-r,10,£5 /?E:fa l/lf6'E;P :!)

From:

Justice Brennan

Circulated: _ _ __ _ _ _ __

JAN 8

1983

Recirculated: _ _ _ __ _ __

~SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.

81-1203

MOSES H. CONE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, PETITIONER v. MERCURY CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[January - , 1983)

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, commenced as a petition for an order to compel
arbitration under § 4 of the United States Arbitration Act of
1925 (Arbitration Act or Act), 9 U. S. C. § 4, presents the
question whether, in light of the policies of the Act and of our
decisions in Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976), and Will v. Calvert Fire
Insurance Co., 437 U. S. 655 (1978), the District Court for
the Middle District of North Carolina properly stayed this diversity action pending resolution of a concurrent state-court
suit. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed
the stay. 656 F. 2d 933, rehearing denied, 664 F. 2d 936
(1981). We granted certiorari. 455 U. S. 937 (1982). We
affirm.

I
Petitioner Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital ("Hospital")
is located in Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondent Mercury Construction Corp. ("Mercury"), a construction contractor, has its principal place of business in Alabama. In July
1975, Mercury and the Hospital entered into a contract for
the construction of additions to the Hospital building. The
contract, drafted by representatives of the Hospital, included

V
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provisions for resolving disputes arising out of the contract or
its breach. All disputes involving interpretation of the contract or performance of the construction work were to be referred in the first instance to J. N. Pease Associates ("Architect"), an independent architectural firm hired by the Hospital to design and oversee the construction project. With
certain stated exceptions, 1 any dispute decided by the Architect (or not decided by it within a stated time) could be submitted by either party to binding arbitration under a broad
arbitration clause in the contract:
"All claims, disputes and other matters in question
arising out of, or relating to, this Contract or the breach
thereof, . . . shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules
of the American Arbitration Association then obtaining
unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. This
agreement to arbitrate shall be specifically enforceable
under the prevailing arbitration law. The award rendered by the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment
may be entered upon it in accordance with applicable law
in any court having jurisdiction thereof." App. 29-30.
The contract also specified the time limits for arbitration
demands. 2
1
The Architect was given final say on "matters relating to artistic effect." App. 28-29. The contract also excluded arbitration on any claim
waived by the making or acceptance of final payment. App. 29. Neither
of these exceptions is asserted to apply in this case.
2
The contract provided that no demand for arbitration could be made
later than thirty days after the Architect's written final decision. In the
case of arbitrable disputes not subject to submission to the Architect, the
demand was required to be made "within a reasonable time after the claim
... has arisen," and in no event after the applicable statute of limitations
had run. App. 29--30.
The contract also set a starting time limit for arbitration demands. No
demand could be made earlier than ten days after presentation of evidence
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Construction on the project began in July 1975. Performance was to be completed by October 1979. 3 In fact, construction was substantially completed in February 1979, and
final inspections were made that June.
At a meeting in October 1977 (during construction), attended by representatives of Mercury, the Hospital, and the
Architect, Mercury agreed, at the Architect's request, to
withhold its claims for delay and impact costs (i. e., claims for
extended overhead or increase in construction costs due to
delay or inaction by the Hospital) until the work was substantially completed. On this record, the Hospital does not contest the existence of this agreement, although it asserts that
the Architect lacked authority to agree to a delay in presentation of claims or to entertain claims after the contract work
was completed.
In January 1980, Mercury submitted to the Architect its
claims for delay and impact costs. Mercury and the Architect discussed the claims over several months, substantially
reducing the amount of the claims. According to the Hospital, it first learned of the existence of Mercury's claims in
April 1980; its lawyers assumed active participation in the
claim procedure in May. The parties differ in their characterizations of the events of the next few months-whether
there were "ongoing negotiations," or merely an "investigation" by the Hospital. In any event, it appears from the
record that lawyers for the Hospital requested additional
information concerning Mercury's claims. As a result, on
August 12, 1980, Mercury gave a detailed presentation of its
claims at a meeting attended by Mercury's representatives
and lawyers, the Hospital's representatives and lawyers, and
to the Architect, unless the Architect rendered a written decision before
that time. App. 29.
3
The completion date, originally set as November 14, 1978, was extended to October 1979 by agreement of the parties.
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representatives of the Architect. Mercury agreed to send
copies of its files to an expert hired by the Hospital, and the
parties agreed to meet again on October 13.
On October 6, Mercury's counsel telephoned the Hospital's
counsel to confirm that the scheduled meeting would go forward. The Hospital's counsel said he would call back the
next day. When he did, he informed Mercury's counsel that
the Hospital would pay nothing on Mercury's claim. He also
said that the Hospital intended to file a declaratory judgment
action in North Carolina state court.
True to its word, the Hospital filed an action on the morning of October 8 in the Superior Court of Guilford County,
North Carolina, naming Mercury and the Architect as defendants. The complaint alleged that Mercury's claim was
without factual or legal basis and that it was barred by the
statute of limitations. It alleged that Mercury had lost any
right to arbitration under the contract due to waiver, laches,
estoppel, and failure to make a timely demand for arbitration. The complaint also alleged various delinquencies on
the part of the Architect. As relief, the Hospital sought a
declaration that there was no right to arbitration; a stay of
arbitration; a declaration that the Hospital bore no liability to
Mercury; and a declaration that if the Hospital should be
found liable in any respect to Mercury, it would be entitled to
indemnity from the Architect. The complaint was served on
Mercury on October 9. On that same day, Mercury's counsel
mailed a demand for arbitration.
On October 15, without notice to Mercury, the Hospital obtained an ex parte injunction from the state court forbidding
Mercury to take any steps directed toward arbitration.
Mercury objected, and the stay was dissolved on October 27.
As soon as the stay was lifted, Mercury filed the present action in the District Court, seeking an order compelling arbitration under § 4 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 4. 4
'Simultaneously, Mercury filed a petition for removal of the Hospital's
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Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. On the
Hospital's motion, the District Court stayed Mercury's
federal-court suit pending resolution of the state-court suit
because the two suits involved the identical issue of the
arbitrability of Mercury's claims. App. to Pet. for Cert.
A-38.

Mercury sought review of the District Court's stay by both
a notice of appeal and a petition for mandamus. A panel of
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard argument
in the case, but before the panel issued any decision, the
Court informed the parties that it would consider the case en
bane. After reargument, the en bane Court held that it had
appellate jurisdiction over the case under 28 U. S. C. § 1291.
It reversed the District Court's stay order and remanded the
case to the District Court with instructions for entry of an
order to arbitrate.

II
Before we address the propriety of the District Judge's
stay order, we must first decide whether that order was appealable to the Court of Appeals under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. 5
Mercury sought appellate review through two alternative
routes-a notice of appeal under § 1291, and a petition for
mandamus under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651. 6
state-court action. The District Court remanded the removed case on the
ground that, because the Hospital and the Architect are both North Carolina corporations, there was no complete diversity. The propriety of the
removal or remand is not before this Court.
5
Section 1291 provides in relevant part:
"The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, . . . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
6
The Hospital argues that because Mercury's filing in the Court of Appeals was styled a petition for mandamus first and a notice of appeal only
"in the alternative," the Hospital was somehow entitled to have the Court
of Appeals apply the stricter standards of review that obtain under the
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Mercury expressly stated that its appeal was based only on
§ 1291, and not on 18 U. S. C. § 1292 (relating to interlocutory appeals). The Hospital contends that the order appealed from was not a "final decision" within § 1291. We disagree and hold that the stay order was final for purposes of
appellate jurisdiction.
Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U. S. 713 (1962), is
instructive in this regard. There the plaintiff brought a federal suit challenging the constitutionality of a state statute.
The District Judge declined to convene a three-judge court
and stayed the federal suit under the Pullman abstention
doctrine. 7 We held that the District Court's action was final
and therefore reviewable by the Court of Appeals, stating:
"The Court of Appeals properly rejected the argument
that the order of the District Court 'was not final and
hence unappealable under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1291, 1292,'
pointing out that '[a]ppellant was effectively out of
court.'" Id., at 715, n. 2. 8
mandamus procedure before considering any appeal. Brief for Petitioner
30-31. We do not understand why this order of proceeding would be of
any benefit to the Hospital; but in any event the contention is frivolous.
In the first place, Mercury also filed a proper notice of appeal in the District Court, see Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3(a). More fundamentally, a court
of appeals has no occasion to engage in extraordinary review by mandamus
"in aid of [its] jurisdictio[n]," 28 U. S. C. § 1651, when it can exercise the
same review by a contemporaneous ordinary appeal. See, e. g., Hines v.
D'Artois, 531 F. 2d 726, 732, and n. 10 (CA5 1976).
1
Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941).
8
The plaintiff in ldlewild had requested injunctive relief against enforcement of the state statute. Nevertheless, it is clear that neither the
Court of Appeals nor this Court based the holding of appealability on the
argument that the District Court had effectively denied injunctive relief.
See generally 28 U. S. C. § 1292(a)(l); Carson v. American Brands, Inc.,
450 U. S. 79 (1981). Section 1292 in terms applies only to interlocutory
orders, and therefore could hardly have been the basis for a holding that
the orders were "final."
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Here, the argument for finality of the District Court's
order is even clearer. A district court stay pursuant to Pullman abstention is entered with the expectation that the federal litigation will resume in the event that the plaintiff does
not obtain relief in state court on state-law grounds. 9 Here,
by contrast, the District Court predicated its stay order on
its conclusion that the federal and state actions involved "the
identical issue of arbitrability of the claims of Mercury Construction Corp. against the Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-38. That issue of arbitrability was the only substantive issue present in the federal suit.
Hence, a stay of the federal suit pending resolution of the
state suit meant that there would be no further litigation in
the federal forum; the state court's judgment on the issue
would be res judicata. 10 Thus, here, even more surely than
in ldlewild, Mercury was "effectively out of court." Hence,
as the Court of Appeals held, this stay order amounts to a
dismissal of the suit. 11
See England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964).
See, e.g., Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v.. Meyer, 664 F. 2d 1176,
1183-1184 (CAll 1981); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Haydu, 637 F. 2d 391, 397-398 (CA5 1981).
"See In re Mercury Construction Corp., 656 F. 2d 933, 937-938, and n.
6 (CA4 1981), citing as dispositive Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F. 2d 103, 10~106
(CA41967). See also Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,
597 F. 2d 798, 808, and n. 15 (CA2 1979); Baltimore Bank for Cooperatives
v. Farmers Cheese Cooperative, 583 F. 2d 104, 108-109 (CA3 1978); Sun
Oil Co. v. FEA, 572 F. 2d 867 (Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. 1978); Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. Laguna Beach, 547 F. 2d 1092, 1093, n. 1(CA91976);
Hines v. D'Artois, 531 F. 2d 726, 730-732 (CA5 1976); Drexler v. Southwest Dubois School Corp., 504 F. 2d 836,838 (CA71974) (en bane); Druker
v. Sullivan, 458 F. 2d 1272, 1274, n. 3 (CAl 1972). But see Acton Corp. v.
Borden, Inc., 670 F. 2d 377, 380-382 (CAl 1982); State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Scholes, 601 F. 2d 1151, 1153-1154 (CAlO
1979); Frederick L. v. Thomas, 578 F. 2d 513, 51~16 (CA3 1978)
(dictum).
Of course, as these cases recognize, Idlewild does not disturb the usual
rule that a stay is not ordinarily a final decision for purposes of§ 1291, since
9

10
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In any event, if the District Court order were not final for
appealability purposes, it would nevertheless be appealable
within the exception to the finality rule under Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949). The factors required to show finality under this exception have been summarized as follows:
"To come within the 'small class' of decisions excepted
from the final-judgment rule by Cohen, the order must
conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of
the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978) (footnote omitted). 12
There can be no dispute that this order meets the second
and third of these criteria. An order that amounts to a refusal to adjudicate the merits plainly presents an important
issue separate from the merits. 13 For the same reason, this
order would be entirely unreviewable if not appealed now.
Once the state court decided the issue of arbitrability, the
federal court· would be bound to honor that determination as
res judicata.
The Hospital contends nevertheless that the District
Court's stay order did not meet the first of the criteria,
namely that it "conclusively determine the disputed quesmost stays do not put the plaintiff "effectively out of court." See, e. g.,
Amdurs, 372 F. 2d, at 105-106. ldlewi,ld's reasoning is limited to cases
where (under Colorado River, abstention, or a closely similar doctrine) the
object of the stay is to require all or a substantial part of the federal suit to
be litigated in a state forum.
12
Accord, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368, 375
(1981); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U. S. 850, 854-855 (1978); Abney
v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 658--659 (1977).
13
The "completely separate from the merits" requirement is a distillation
of the principle that there should not be piecemeal review of "steps towards
final judgment in which they will merge." Cohen v. Beneficial Loan
Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949). In this case, of course, there is no step
towards final judgment, but a refusal to proceed at all.
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tion." But this is true only in the technical sense that every
order short of a final decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the district judge. 14 In this case, however, there is
no basis to suppose that the District Judge contemplated any
reconsideration of his decision to defer to the parallel statecourt suit. He surely would not have made that decision in
the first instance unless he had expected the state court to
resolve all relevant issues adequately. It is not clear why
the Judge chose to stay the case rather than to dismiss it outright; for all that the record shows, there was no reason other
than the form of the Hospital's motion. Whatever the reason, however, the practical effect of his order was entirely
the same for present purposes, and the order was appealable.
See infra, at Part IVE.
III
We turn now to the principal issue to be addressed, namely
the propriety of the District Court's decision to stay this federal suit out of deference to the parallel litigation brought in
See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(b); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478, at 788-792 (1981).
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), held that the Cohen
rule did not apply to a class decertification order because, among other reasons, such an order is "inherently tentative" under Federal Rule of Civ.
Procedure 23(c)(l), which provides that such an order may be "altered or
amended before the decision on the merits." 437 U. S., at 469, and n. 11.
Of course, as Rule 54(b) provides, virtually all interlocutory orders may be
altered or amended before final judgment if sufficient cause is shown; yet
that does not make all pretrial orders "inherently tentative" in the sense of
that phrase in Coopers & Lybrand. The rationale behind Rule 23(c)(l) is
that a certification decision should be made "[a]s soon as practicable," even
though later events or discoveries may mandate a different result. Many
other orders, by contrast, are made with the expectation that they will be
the final word on the subject addressed. Certainly that was the case with
the order at issue in this case. The reasoning of Coopers & Lybrand does
not reach all pretrial orders that are formally subject to revision, but only
those as to which some revision might reasonably be expected in the ordinary course of litigation.
14

81-120~PINION
10 MOSES H. CONE HOSPITAL v. MERCURY CONSTR. CORP.

state court. Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976) provides persuasive guidance in deciding this question.
A

Colorado River involved the effect of the McCarran
Amendment, 66 Stat. 560, 43 U. S. C. § 666, on the existence
and exercise of federal-court jurisdiction to adjudicate federal
water rights, 28 U. S. C. § 1345. The Amendment waives
the Government's sovereign immunity to permit the joinder
of the United States in some state-court suits for the adjudication of water rights. In Colorado River, however, the
Government proceeded in Federal District Court, bringing
suit against some 1,000 nonfederal water users, seeking a
declaration of the water rights of certain federal entities and
Indian tribes. Shortly thereafter, a defendant in that suit
sought to join the United States in a state-court proceeding
for the comprehensive adjudication and administration of all
water rights within the river system that was the subject of
the federal-court suit. The District Court dismissed the federal suit, holding that the abstention doctrine required deference to the state-court proceedings. The Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the suit of the
United States was within the District Court's jurisdiction
under 28 U. S. C. § 1345 and that abstention was inappropriate. We reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
affirmed the judgment of the District Court dismissing the
complaint.
We began our analysis by examining the abstention doctrine in its various forms. We noted:
"Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is
the exception, not the rule. 'The doctrine of abstention,
under which a District Court may decline to exercise or
postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District
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Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.
Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the
State court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.' " 15
After canvassing the three categories of abstention, we concluded that none of them applied to the case at hand. 424
U.S., at 813-817. 16
Nevertheless, we held that the District Court's dismissal
was proper on another ground-one resting not on considerations of state-federal comity or on avoidance of constitutional decisions, as does abstention, but on "considerations of
'[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation
of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.' " 17 We noted that " 'the pend ency of an action in the
state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction,"' and that the
federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation ... to
exercise the jurisdiction given them." 18 We continued:
"Given this obligation, and the absence of weightier considerations of constitutional adjudication and state-federal relations, the circumstances permitting the dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial
administration are considerably more limited than the
'"Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424
U. S. 800, 813 (1976), quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda
Co., 360 U. S. 185, 188-189 (1959).
16
There is no contention here that any of the categories of the abstention
doctrine apply to this case.
17
Colorado River, 424 U. S., at 817, quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v.
C-0-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U. S. 180, 183 (1952).
18
Colorado River, 424 U.S., at 817, quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217
u. s. 268, 282 (1910).
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circumstances appropriate for abstention. The former
circumstances, though exceptional, do nevertheless
exist." Id., at 818.
We declined to prescribe a hard and fast rule for dismissals of
this type, but instead described some of the factors relevant
to the decision.
"It has been held, for example, that the court first assuming jurisdiction over property may exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. . . . In assessing the appropriateness of dismissal in the event of
an exercise of concurrent jurisdiction, a federal court
may also consider such factors as the inconvenience of
the federal forum; the desirability of avoiding piecemeal
litigation; and the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums. No one factor is necessarily determinative; a carefully considered judgment
taking into account both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the combination of factors counselling against
that exercise is required. Only the clearest of justifications will warrant dismissal." Id., at 818--819 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
As this passage makes clear, the decision whether to dismiss a federal action because of parallel state-court litigation
does not rest on a mechanical checklist, but on a careful balancing of the important factors as they apply in a given case,
with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of
jurisdiction. The weight to be given to any one factor may
vary greatly from case to case, depending on the particular
setting of the case. Colorado River itself illustrates this
principle in operation. By far the most important factor in
our decision to approve the dismissal there was the "clear
federal policy ... [of] avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of
water rights in a river system," id., at 819, as evinced in the
McCarran Amendment. We recognized that the Amend-
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ment represents Congress's judgment that the field of water
rights is one peculiarly appropriate for comprehensive treatment in the forums having the greatest experience and expertise, assisted by state administrative officers acting under
the state courts. Id., at 819-820. In addition, we noted
that other factors in the case tended to support dismissalthe absence of any substantial progress in the federal-court
litigation; the presence in the suit of extensive rights governed by state law; the geographical inconvenience of the federal forum; and the Government's previous willingness to litigate similar suits in state court. Id., at 820.

B
Before discussing the application of Colorado Rivers exceptional-circumstances test, we must address the Hospital's
argument that that test was undermined by our subsequent
decision in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U. S. 655
· (1978). We find no merit in this argument for at least two
reasons.
The Hospital relies on the opinion of JUSTICE REHNQUIST,
announcing the judgment of the Court. The Hospital argues
that JUSTICE REHNQUIST's opinion, if not expressly overruling Colorado River, at least modifies its holding substantially. But it is clear that a majority of the Court reaffirmed
the Colorado River test in Calvert. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's
opinion commanded only four votes. It was opposed by the
dissenting opinion, in which four Justices concluded that the
Calvert District Court's stay was impermissible under Colorado River. 437 u. s., at 66~69, 672-674 (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting). JUSTICE BLACKMUN, although concurring in
the judgment, agreed with the dissent that Colorado Rivers
exceptional-circumstances test was controlling; he voted to
remand to permit the District Court to apply the Colorado
River factors in the first instance. 19 Id., at 667-668. On re19

The decision in Colorado River came down after the District Court's
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mand, the Court of Appeals correctly recognized that the
four dissenting Justices and JUSTICE BLACKMUN formed a
majority to require application of the Colorado River test.
Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will, 586 F. 2d 12 (CA7
1978). 20
Even on the basis of JUSTICE REHNQUIST's opinion, however, there is an obvious distinction between Calvert and this
case. The key to Calvert was the standard for issuance of a
writ of mandamus under 28 U. S. C. § 1651. 21 As JUSTICE
stay order in Calvert but before the Court of Appeals issued its mandamus
-· in that case.
20
On remand from our decision in Calvert, the District Court and Court
of Appeals concluded that the stay should be continued, but rested that decision on a ground not addressed in the prior Court of Appeals decision
(Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will, 560 F. 2d 792 (CA7 1977)) or in any of
this Court's opinions in the case. They concluded that the filing of the federal suit was a "defensive tactical maneuver" based on a contrived federal
claim; hence, a stay was called for as "a means to deter vexatious use of the
federal courts." The courts also noted that, in the interim, the basis for
the plaintiffs assertion of exclusive federal jurisdiction had vanished.
Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co., 600 F.
2d 1228, 1234-1236 (CA71979), affg 459 F. Supp. 859 (ND Ill. 1978). The
case did not come before this Court for review a second time.
The Court of Appeals in this case relied on similar reasoning. It concluded that, despite chronological priority of filing, the Hospital's statecourt suit was a contrived, defensive reaction to Mercury's expected claim
for relief and for arbitration. 656 F. 2d, at 944-945.
The reasoning of the Courts of Appeals in this case and in Calvert-that
the vexatious or reactive nature of either the federal or the state litigation
may influence the decision whether to defer to a parallel state litigation
under Colorado River-has considerable merit. We need not rely on such
reasoning here, however, for we conclude infra that even if the Hospital
acted in complete good faith there were no exceptional circumstances warranting the District Court's stay.
21
The Court of Appeals in Calvert had held that it lacked jurisdiction to
entertain an ordinary appeal, apparently because a portion of the federal
litigation was the subject of exclusive federal jurisdiction and would therefore remain to be disposed of in federal court after the conclusion of statecourt proceedings. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will, 560 F. 2d 792, 794
(CA7 1977), citing Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Assn., 526 F. 2d
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REHNQUIST stressed, such extraordinary writs are used in
aid of appellate jurisdiction only to confine an inferior court to
a lawful exercise of its prescribed authority, or to compel it to
exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so. The
movant must show that his right to the writ is clear and indisputable. 437 U. S., at 661-662, 664, 665-666 (opinion of
REHNQUIST, J.). JUSTICE REHNQUIST concluded that that
the movant in Calvert had failed to meet this burden. At the
same time, he noted that the movant might have succeeded
on a proper appeal. Id., at 665. In this case we have held
that the Court of Appeals did have appellate jurisdiction; it
properly exercised that jurisdiction to find that the District
Court's stay was impermissible under Colorado River.
The Hospital further contends that Calvert requires reversal here because the opinions of JUSTICE REHNQUIST and
JUSTICE BLACKMUN require greater deference to the discretion of the District Court than was given by the Court of Appeals in this case. Under both Calvert and Colorado River,
of course, the decision whether to defer to the state courts is
necessarily left to the discretion of the district court in the
first instance. Yet to say that the district court has discretion is not to say that its decision is unreviewable; such discretion must be exercised under the relevant standard prescribed by this Court. In this case, the relevant standard is
Colorado Rivers exceptional-circumstances test, as elucidated by the factors discussed in that case. As we shall now
explain, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the District
Court in this case abused its discretion in granting the stay.

IV
Applying the Colorado River factors to this case, it is clear
that there was no showing of the requisite exceptional cir537, 540 (CA3 1975). Cf. Drexler v. Southwest Dubois School Corp., 504
F. 2d 836, 838 (CA 7 1974) (en bane) (stay oflitigation pending exhaustion of
state remedies is final under ldlewild). The issue of appellate jurisdiction
was not presented to this Court in Calvert.
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cumstances to justify the District Court's stay.
The Hospital concedes that the first two factors mentioned
in Colorado River are not present here. There was no assumption by either court of jurisdiction over any res or property, nor is there any contention that the federal forum was
any less convenient to the parties than the state forum. The
remaining factors-avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and the
order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums-far from supporting the stay, actually counsel against
it.
A

There is no force here to the consideration that was paramount in Colorado River itself-the danger of piecemeal
litigation.
The Hospital points out that it has two substantive disputes here--one with Mercury, concerning Mercury's claim
for delay and impact costs, and the other with the Architect,
concerning the Hospital's claim for indemnity for any liability
it may have to Mercury. The latter dispute cannot be sent
to arbitration without the Architect's consent, since there is
no arbitration agreement between the Hospital and the Architect. It is true, therefore, that if Mercury obtains an arbitration order for its dispute, the Hospital will be forced to
resolve these related disputes in different forums. That misfortune, however, is not the result of any choice between the
federal and state courts; it occurs because the relevant federal law requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give
effect to an arbitration agreement. 22 Under the Arbitration
Act, an arbitration agreement must be enforced notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the
22

This provides a sharp contrast with the key statute at issue in Colorado River-the McCarran Amendment. There, as we stressed, the primary policy of the statute was the avoidance of piecemeal litigation. 424
U. S., at 819-820.
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underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement. 23 If
the dispute between Mercury and the Hospital is arbitrable
under the Act, then the Hospital's two disputes will be resolved separately-one in arbitration, and the other (if at all)
in state-court litigation. Conversely, if the dispute between
Mercury and the Hospital is not arbitrable, then both disputes will be resolved in state court. But neither of those
two outcomes depends at all on which court decides the question of arbitrability. Hence, a decision to allow that issue to
be decided in state rather than federal court accomplishes absolutely nothing in the way of avoiding piecemeal resolution
of disputes.
B
The order in which the concurrent tribunals obtained and
exercised jurisdiction cuts against, not for, the District
Court's stay in this case. The Hospital argues that the stay
was proper because the state-court suit was filed some 19
days before the federal suit. In the first place, this argument disregards the obvious reason for the Hospital's priority in filing. An indispensable element of Mercury's cause of
action under § 4 for an arbitration order is the Hospital's refusal to arbitrate. Seen. 27, infra. That refusal did not occur until less than a day before the Hospital filed its state
suit. Hence, Mercury simply had no reasonable opportunity
to file its § 4 petition first. Moreover, the Hospital sue23
E.g., C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan International Co., 552 F. 2d 1228,
1231-1232 (CA7 1977); Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Industries, Inc., 514
F. 2d 614,617 (CAl 1975); Hamilton Life Insurance Company v. Republic
National Life Insurance Co., 408 F. 2d 606, 609 (CA2 1969).
In some cases, of course, it may be advisable to stay litigation among the
non-arbitrating parties pending the outcome of the litigation. That decision is one left to the district court (or to the state trial court under applicable state procedural rules) as a matter of its discretion to control its
docket. See generally Landis v. North American Co., 299 U. S. 248,
254-255 (1936).

81-120~OPINION
18 MOSES H. CONE HOSPITAL v. MERCURY CONSTR. CORP.

ceeded in obtaining an ex parte injunction from the state
court forbidding Mercury from taking any steps to secure arbitration. 24 Mercury filed its § 4 petition the same day that
the injunction was dissolved. 25
That aside, the Hospital's priority argument gives too mechanical a reading to the "priority" element of the Colorado
River balance. This factor, as with the other Colorado
River factors, is to be applied in a pragmatic, flexible manner
with a view to the realities of the case at hand. Thus, priority should not be measured exclusively by which complaint
was filed first, but rather in terms of how much progress has
been made in the two actions. Colorado River illustrates
this point well. There, the federal suit was actually filed
first. Nevertheless, we pointed out as a factor favoring dismissal "the apparent absence of any proceedings in the District Court, other than the filing of the complaint, prior to the
motion to dismiss." 424 U. S., at 820. Here, the opposite
was true. It was the state-court suit in which no substantial
proceedings (excepting only the abortive temporary injunction) had taken place at the time of the decision to stay. In
the federal suit, by contrast, the parties had taken most of
the steps necessary to a resolution of the arbitrability issue. 26
24
Of course we do not mean to say that the state court's injunction could
properly have been applied to prevent Mercury from filing or prosecuting a
federal lawsuit. See General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U. S. 12 (1977);
Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U. S. 408 (1964). Mercury was not
obliged, however, to put itself in danger of contempt sanctions merely in
order to cut short the period of the Hospital's priority of filing.
26
See also n. 20 supra.
28
Under § 6 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 6, Mercury's application
for a § 4 order was properly treated procedurally as a motion. Mercury
submitted affidavits, legal briefs, and documentary evidence in support of
the order sought. The Hospital responded with full briefing and extensive
evidentiary submissions on the arbitrability issue, and it requested oral argument and a jury trial. At the same time, it made its successful motion
for a stay. It is readily apparent that if the District Court had denied the
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In realistic terms, the federal suit was running well ahead of
the state suit at the very time that the District Court decided
to refuse to adjudicate the case.
This refusal to proceed was plainly erroneous in view of
Congress's clear intent, in the Arbitration Act, to move the
parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible. The Act provides two
parallel devices for enforcing an arbitration agreement: a
stay of litigation in any case raising a dispute referrable to
arbitration, 9 U. S. C. § 3, and an affirmative order to engage
in arbitration, § 4. Both of these sections call for an expeditious and summary hearing, with only restricted inquiry
into factual issues. 'l:1 Assuming that the state court would
have granted prompt relief to Mercury under the Act, 28 there
still would have been an inevitable delay as a result of the
stay, it doubtless could and should have gone on to decide the arbitrability
point in very short order.
l?7 Section 3 provides that if a suit is brought on the merits of a dispute
covered by an arbitration agreement,
"the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the
action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration." 9 U. S. C. § 3.
Section 4 provides that a district court must enter an order to arbitrate
"upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or
the failure to comply therewith is not in issue." If either of these points is
in issue, § 4 provides that "the court shall proceed summarily" to a trial on
that point. Section 6 further provides that a request for relief under either § 3 or § 4 is to be treated procedurally as a motion.
Moreover, the policy of the Arbitration Act requires a liberal reading of
arbitration agreements, see infra, at 20-21. As a result, some issues that
might be thought relevant to arbitrability are themselves arbitrable-further speeding the procedure under §§ 3 and 4. See, e. g., Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
ZB See n. 34, infra; but cf. nn. 35--36, infra.
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District Court's stay. The stay thus frustrated the statutory
policy of rapid and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration
agreements.

C
Besides the four factors expressly discussed in Colorado
River, there is another that emerges from Calvert-the fact
that federal law provides the rule of decision on the merits.
The state-versus-federal-law factor was of ambiguous relevance in Colorado River. 29 In Calvert, however, both the
four-vote dissenting opinion and JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S opinion concurring in the judgment pointed out that it is ordinarily inappropriate to defer to state courts for the resolution
of rights under federal law, especially where federal jurisdiction over the claims at stake is exclusive. 437 U. S., at 667
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 668--677
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting). See also Colorado River, 424
U. S., at 815, n. 21; McNeese v. Board of Education, 373
668, 672-674 (1963).
The basic issue presented in Mercury's federal suit was the
arbitrability of the dispute between Mercury and the Hospital. Federal law in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs
that issue in either state or federal court. Section 2 is the
primary substantive provision of the Act, declaring that a
written agreement to arbitrate "in any maritime transaction
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract." 9 U. S. C. § 2. 30 Section 2 is a congressional

u. s.

The federal/state-law point was of little guidance in Colorado River for
two reasons. First, there was an affirmative policy in federal law expressly approving litigation of federal water rights in state court-the
McCarran Amendment. Second, although the water rights of the United
States and the Indian tribes were governed in part by federal law, the bulk
of the litigation would necessarily revolve around the state-law water
rights of the thousand nonfederal parties in the case-a factor on which we
expressly relied in approving the District Court's stay. 424 U. S., at 820.
30
"Maritime transaction" and "commerce" are defined in § 1 of the Ar29
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declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary. The effect of the section is to
create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of
the Act. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Corp., 388 U. S. 395 (1967), for example, the parties had
signed a contract containing an arbitration clause, but one
party alleged that there had been fraud in the inducement of
the entire contract (although the alleged fraud did not go to
the arbitration clause in particular). The issue before us was
whether the issue of fraud in the inducement was itself an arbitrable controversy. We held that the language and policies of the Act required the conclusion that the fraud issue is
arbitrable. Id., at 402--404. Although our holding in Prima
Paint extended only to the specific issue presented, the
courts of appeals have since consistently concluded that questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard
for the federal policy favoring arbitration. We agree. Any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is
the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability. 31
To be sure, the source-of-law factor has less significance
here than in Calvert, since the federal courts' jurisdiction to
enforce the Arbitration Act is concurrent with that of the
bitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 1.
31
E . g., Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F. 2d 638, 643 (CA7
1981); Wick v. Atlantic Marine, Inc ., 605 F . 2d 166, 168 (CA5 1979);
Becker Autoradio U. S. A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F .
2d 39, 43--45 (CA3 1978); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 174 U. S. App. D. C.
253, 266, 531 F. 2d 585, 598 (1976); Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Industries,
Inc ., 514 F. 2d 614, 616-617 (CAl 1975); Germany v. River Terminal R.
Co., 477 F. 2d 546, 547 (CA61973); Coenen v. R . W . Pressprich & Co., 453
F. 2d 1209, 1211-1212 (CA2), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 949 (1972); Hart v.
Orion Insurance Co., 453 F. 2d 1358, 1360-1361 (CAl0 1971).
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state courts. 32 But we emphasize that our task in cases such
as this is not to find some substantial reason for the exercise
of federal jurisdiction by the district court; rather, the task is
to ascertain whether there exist "exceptional" circumstances,
the "clearest of justifications," that can suffice under Colorado River to justify the surrender of that jurisdiction. The
mere fact that state law governs the merits is not alone
enough to warrant that surrender; whereas the fact that federal law governs should be a major consideration militating
against it. 33
D
Finally, in this case an important reason against allowing a
stay is the probable inadequacy of the state-court proceeding
to protect Mercury's rights. We are not to be understood to
impeach the competence or procedures of the North Carolina
courts. Moreover, state courts, as much as federal courts,
are obliged to grant stays of litigation under § 3 of the Arbitration Act. 34 It is less clear, however, whether the same
See n. 34, infra.
The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federalcourt jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does
not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) or otherwise. Section 4 provides for an order
compelling arbitration only when the federal district court would have jurisdiction over a suit on the underlying dispute; hence, there must be diversity of citizenship or some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction
before the order can issue. E.g., Commercial Metals Co. V. Balfour,
Guthrie, & Co., 577 F. 2d 264, 268--269 (CA5 1978), and cases cited. Section 3 likewise limits the federal courts to the ·extent that a federal court
cannot stay a suit pending before it unless there is such a suit in existence.
Nevertheless, although enforcement of the Act is left in large part to the
state courts, it nevertheless represents federal policy to be vindicated by
the federal courts where otherwise appropriate.
We need not address whether a federal court might stay a state-court
suit pending arbitration under 28 U. S. C. § 2283.
33
Cf. n. 20, supra.
34
Although § 3 refers ambiguously to a suit "in any of the courts of the
32
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is true of an order to compel arbitration under § 4 of the Act. 36
We need not resolve that question here; it suffices to say that
there was, at a minimum, substantial room for doubt that
Mercury could obtain from the state court an order compelling the Hospital to arbitrate. 36 In many cases, no doubt, a
§ 3 stay is quite adequate to protect the right to arbitration.
But in a case such as this, where the party opposing arbitration is the one from whom payment or performance is sought,
a stay of litigation alone is not enough. It leaves the recalciUnited States," the state courts have almost unanimously recognized that
the stay provision of § 3 applies to suits in state as well as federal courts,
requiring them to issue the same speedy relief when a dispute is referrable
to arbitration. (The North Carolina Supreme Court has so held, although
not until after the District Court ordered this stay. Burke County Public
Schools Board of Education v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408,279 S.E.
2d 816 (1981).) This is necessary to carry out Congress's intent to mandate enforcement of all covered arbitration agreements; Congress can
hardly have meant that an agreement to arbitrate can be enforced against a
party who attempts to litigate an arbitrable dispute in federal court but not
against one who sues on the same dispute in state court. See also Prima
Paint, 388 U. S., at 404.
36
Section 4, unlike § 3, speaks only of a petition to "any United States
district court." Nonetheless, at least one state court has held that§ 4 does
require state courts to issue § 4 orders to arbitrate where the section's conditions are met. Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 67
Cal. App. 3d 19, 24-25, 136 Cal. Rptr. 378, 380-381 (1977).
""As a historical matter, there was considerable doubt at the time of the
District Court's stay that the North Carolina court would have granted
even a § 3 stay of litigation. The then-controlling precedent in North Carolina was to the effect that a contract such as that between Mercury and
the Hospital was not subject to the Arbitration Act at all, on the reasoning
that a construction project is not "commerce'.' within the meaning of §§ 1
and 2 of the Act. Burke County Public Schools Board of Education v.
Shaver Partnership, 46 N.C. App. 573, 265 S.E. 2d 481 (1980); BryantDurham Electric Co. v. Durham County Hospital Corp., 42 N.C. App.
351, 256 S.E. 2d 529 (1979). The North Carolina Supreme Court has, however, since repudiated those decisions. Burke County Public Schools
Board of Education v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408, 279 S.E. 2d 816
(1981).
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trant party free to sit and do nothing-neither to litigate nor
to arbitrate. If the state court stayed litigation pending arbitration but declined to compel the Hospital to arbitrate,
Mercury would have no sure way to proceed with its claims
except to return to federal court to obtain a § 4 order-a
pointless and wasteful burden on the supposedly summary
and speedy procedures prescribed by the Arbitration Act.
E
The Hospital argues that the Colorado River test is somehow inapplicable because in this case the District Court
merely stayed the federal litigation rather than dismissing
the suit outright, as in Colorado River. It contends that
Mercury remains free to seek to reopen the federal suit on a
showing that the state suit has failed to adjudicate its rights,
and that a stay is less onerous than a dismissal. We have
already rejected this distinction, for purposes of this case, in
discussing appellate jurisdiction. Supra, at 8-9. We reject
it in this context for the same reasons.
We have no occasion in this case to decide whether a dismissal or a stay should ordinarily be the preferred course of
action when a district court properly finds that Colorado
River counsels in favor of deferring to a parallel state-court
suit. 37 We can say, however, that a stay is as much a refusal
to exercise federal jurisdiction as a dismissal. When a district court decides to dismiss or stay under Colorado River, it
presumably concludes that the parallel state-court litigation
will be an adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt resolution of the issues between the parties. If there is any substantial doubt as to this, it would be a serious abuse of discretion to grant the stay or dismissal at all. See supra, at Part
This reservation, of course, applies only to cases under Colorado
River. Cf., e. g., American Trial Lawyers Assn. v. New Jersey Supreme
Court, 409 U. S. 467 (1973) (stay rather than dismissal in Pullman
abstention).
37
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IV D; McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668,
674-676 (1963). Thus, the decision to invoke Colorado River
necessarily contemplates that the federal court will have
nothing further to do in resolving any substantive part of the
case, whether it stays or dismisses. See 17 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure§ 4247, at
517-519 (1978).
Moreover, assuming that for some unexpected reason the
state forum does turn out to be inadequate in some respect,
the Hospital's argument fails to make out any genuine difference between a stay and a dismissal. It is true that Mercury
could seek to return to federal court if it proved necessary;
but that would be equally true if the District Court had dismissed the case. It is highly questionable whether this this
Court would have approved a dismissal of a federal suit in
Colorado River (or in any of the abstention cases, see supra,
at 10-11) if the federal courts did not remain open to a dismissed plaintiff who later demonstrated the inadequacy of
the state forum.
V
In addition to reversing the District Court's stay, the
Court of Appeals decided that the underlying contractual dispute between Mercury and the Hospital is arbitrable under
the Arbitration Act and the terms of the parties' arbitration
agreement. It reversed the District Court's judgment and
remanded the case "with instructions to proceed in conformity herewith." 656 F. 2d, at 946. In effect, the Court of
Appeals directed the District Court to enter a § 4 order to
arbitrate.
In this Court, the Hospital does not contest the substantive correctness of the Court of Appeals's holding on
arbitrability. It does raise several objections to the procedures the Court of Appeals used in considering and deciding
this case. In particular, it points out that the only issue formally appealed to the Court of Appeals was the propriety of
the District Court's stay order. Ordinarily, we would not
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expect the Court of Appeals to pass on issues not decided in
the District Court. In the present case, however, we are
not disposed to disturb the Court's discretion in its handling
of the case in view of the special interests at stake and the
apparent lack of any prejudice to the parties. 28 U. S. C.
§ 2106 gives the courts of appeals some latitude in entering an
order to achieve justice in the circumstances. The Arbitration Act calls for a summary and speedy disposition of motions or petitions to enforce arbitration clauses. The Court
of Appeals had in the record full briefs and evidentiary submissions from both parties on the merits of arbitrability, and
held that there were no disputed issues of fact requiring a
jury trial before a § 4 order could issue. Under these circumstances, the Court acted within its authority in deciding
the legal issues presented in order to facilitate the prompt arbitration that Congress envisaged.
Affirmed.
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